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
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ALLEN WELSH DULLES
AS DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
26 FEBRUARY 1953 - 29 NOVEMBER 1961

VOLUME IV CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT
AND INTERNAL ADMINISTRATION

DCI-2



by

Wayne G. Jackson

HISTORICAL STAFF
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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Allen Welsh Dulles

As Director of Central Intelligence

26 February 1953 - 29 November 1961

Volume IV Congressional Oversight and
Internal Administration

Chapter 1

Services of Common Concern

There are two provisions of the National Security Act which allow the National Security Council (NSC) to assign to CIA activities other than those specifically mentioned. Section 102(d) (4) provides that the Agency shall

perform, for the benefit of the existing intelligence agencies, such additional services of common concern as the National Security Council determines can be more efficiently accomplished centrally.

Section 102(d) (5) further provides that CIA shall

perform such other functions related to intelligence affecting the national security as the National Security Council may from time to time direct.

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There were doubtless many different ideas as to what would be authorized under these paragraphs. The birth of the CIA was attended by a variety of controversies. The departments with established intelligence components sought to protect their prerogatives, while the promoters of the idea of centralized intelligence (including Dulles) undoubtedly foresaw a much more widespread jurisdiction for the Agency. Over the years, the duties assigned to the Agency did increase; more and more functions carried on by other departments were transferred to CIA. There were many factors that contributed to this trend. The realization grew that a centralized effort could in many cases prove more effective than a fractionalized one, and the capacity of the Agency to perform was constantly growing. It was recognized that a professional intelligence organization with experience and continuity could perform with a competence not to be matched by intelligence organizations whose personnel often rotated to other duties, as was true of the Armed Services and the State Department.

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The matter of finances may also have been a contributing factor. The State Department was unable to obtain the appropriations needed for a number of its potential functions -- especially for intelligence research and production. State could only carry out the intelligence production functions assigned to it by the NSC by calling on CIA for the necessary funds. The NSC had directed that

In order to provide for the collection of the data which is the responsibility of the Department of State, the Department of State shall take appropriate measures to obtain the necessary funds from the Congress or from the Agencies served, other than the Department of Defense ... 1/*

As a practical matter, however, there were no steps which State could take to persuade Congressman Rooney and others in Congress to grant appropriations. These words specifically applied to the collection of foreign scientific and technical data, but they were evidence of the desire of the NSC that the various departments should finance their own intelligence

* For serially numbered source references, see Appendix A.

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responsibilities. They are of a piece with another NSC directive:

Each agency shall endeavor to maintain adequate research facilities, not only to accomplish the intelligence production tasks allocated to it directly under the foregoing provisions but also to provide such additional intelligence reports or estimates within its field of dominant interest as may be necessary to satisfy the requirements of the other agencies under such allocations. 2/

These NSCID's, which first appeared in 1948-49, remained in effect without change until 1958, when there was a general revision.

In the same way, the service intelligence components may have felt financial pressures. In the 1950's, with the advent of such highly sophisticated collection means as overhead reconnaissance and ELINT, the costs of collecting and processing intelligence increased immensely. These costs and the glamor of the new methods may have influenced the services and the Department of Defense to pass on to CIA some intelligence analysis and production tasks, as in the field of economics.

CIA did not have serious appropriations problems. Since its budget requests were hidden in the requests

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of other departments and agencies and were not debated in Congress, and since there was a real if indefinable aura of secrecy about all its activities which both discouraged investigation in Congress and protected Congressmen from awkward questions from their constituents, CIA was able to take over functions which were originally assigned to others.

The provisions of the National Security Act by their broad wording had a built-in flexibility which permitted a significant shift of functions. The early NSCID's, the directives by which the NSC guided the intelligence community, spelled out in some detail those functions which the CIA should carry out as a service of common concern. Even when this specific term was omitted, the intent was clear. There were a number of functions which clearly should be centralized and which no established department probably wanted in the least to undertake. One function was the monitoring of foreign radio broadcasts. This was assigned to CIA by the NSC in 1947 and has remained a CIA function. 3/* Another was

* See DDI Historical Series, FBIS-1.

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the coordination of the production of basic intelligence in the NIS series. 4/* It should be noted, however, that the responsibility for the production of basic intelligence *per se* was originally assigned to the Department of State and the services; no production assignments were made to CIA.

This point ran through all the early directives of the NSC. CIA was assigned a variety of coordination functions and was given the management of those programs which clearly transcended the functions of any one department such as the NIS Program, the defector program,** procurement and exploitation of foreign publications, *** and domestic exploitation of travellers and others with intelligence potential. **** The Agency also was responsible for producing coordinated national intelligence (primarily National Intelligence Estimates). But when it came to the production of intelligence which the various departments believed to be directly relevant to their

* See DDI Historical Series, OBG-1 and OBG-11.

** See DDI Historical Series, DCS-2

*** See DDI Historical Series, FBIS-5.

**** See DDI Historical Series, DCS-5.

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missions, the documentation carefully preserved to those departments the responsibility for intelligence production. In general, CIA was given the task of coordination, that is, keeping an eye on the community to assure that the best available talents and efforts were brought to bear, but its production was limited at most to supplementing the work of others.

NSCID 15 (13 June 1951), for example, dealt with the production of foreign economic intelligence. Defense had the responsibility of producing economic intelligence relating to such military matters as military production, shipbuilding, and logistics. State was responsible for the production of all other foreign economic intelligence. CIA was to keep an eye on the whole field in order to make recommendations to the NSC and was to

Conduct, as a service of common concern, such foreign economic research and produce such foreign economic intelligence as may be required (a) to supplement that produced by other agencies either in the discharge of their regular departmental missions or in fulfillment of assigned intelligence responsibilities; (b) to fulfill requests of the Intelligence Advisory Committee.

When NSCID 16 (7 March 1953) directed the DCI to

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provide as a service to IAC agencies "English language excerpts, summaries, abstracts, and compilations from foreign language publications," it went on to say that the coordination of translation services "shall not prejudice the maintenance of facilities necessary to meet departmental demands."

As time went on, the realities of intelligence production changed, and CIA took on more and more production activities. In a variety of ways the NSCID's became out of step with the actual functioning of the intelligence community. Early apprehensions had been allayed; CIA had shown itself capable and experienced, and the *modus operandi* initiated by General Smith and continued and expanded by Dulles had had its effect. The practice of seeking agreement before taking any important steps and of negotiating changes rather than seeking to impose them bore fruit. When in late 1956, the PBCFIA, in its first set of recommendations urged that all NSCID's be revised and brought up to date, 5/ General Truscott found no great difficulties so long as he did not tread too heavily on departmental toes. The

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task was time-consuming and was not completed until April 1958. Indicative of the confidence which had grown up in the community was the reduction of the number of NSCID's from 17 to 6. (There actually were seven, but No. 7, "Critical Intelligence Communications," was a new subject.)

While the original series of NSCID's, and their amendments spelled out a considerable amount of detail in the assignment of tasks, the new series consisted of some basic guidelines and dealt specifically with only a few separate subjects such as the defector program, espionage and counterintelligence abroad, and COMINT. While clauses in the general directives did mention some specifics, most of the details were left to the DCID's, to be issued by the DCI with the concurrence of the IAC (later the USIB). If Dulles had not instilled in the community a sense of confidence and cooperation, it probably would still have been necessary to spell out details in the NSCID's, which were approved in the NSC, where the Secretaries could appeal to the President directly and where the DCI was only an advisor.

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The increasing role of CIA can be shown by running down a few specifics: NSCID 8 (25 May 1948) -- which remained in effect until 1958 -- gave CIA the task of codifying and indexing biographical data on foreign scientific and technological personalities collected by other departments and making such codified and indexed material available to others. This specific allocation of responsibility disappeared in the general revisions of the NSCID's in 1958. In paragraph 16 of the 21 April 1958 version of NSCID 1, it was provided that

Central reference facilities as a service of common concern shall be provided by the Central Intelligence Agency and/or other departments and agencies, as appropriate.

This language included that useful phrase "as appropriate" which essentially meant, "you work the details out among yourselves." Other provisions of NSCID 1, particularly paragraph 5, in effect left the specific allocation of centralized responsibility to be accomplished in DCID's.

The responsibilities for maintaining biographic intelligence were prescribed by DCID 1/9 (17 December

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1958) which allocated to the Department of State "political, social and cultural personalities, and economic personalities of political significance." The services kept responsibility for military personnel, and CIA's category was expanded to include "scientific and technical personalities, and significant personalities not covered by the Department of State." This DCID was amended on 26 October 1961. While biographic intelligence on military personalities was assigned to the Defense Department, where it still is (1973), CIA was allotted a general responsibility for all the rest of the field. State had, in fact, transferred its responsibilities for biographic intelligence production to CIA on 1 July 1961, although agreement to this change had been reached earlier. 6/ This particular series of revisions is perhaps of no great importance in itself; it is cited as an example of the trend during the 1950's to centralize more and more functions in CIA.

Changes in the way the intelligence community actually worked were not necessarily or even often reflected in the formal directives. It was one thing for functions to shift by informal understanding,

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by development of capabilities in CIA which corresponded to diminishing capabilities in other departments. It was quite a different one to make formal changes in the basic directives. A formal change in a charter or directive automatically brings out the jurisdictional combativeness of any bureaucrat, and a man experienced in the ways of bureaucracy is reluctant to tamper with matters which have little practical importance but which may touch off a spirited bureaucratic battle. Functions are most effectively shifted by first establishing informal understandings that have been worked out gradually with people who have learned to trust one another and to establish convenient and satisfactory relations. This was the way Dulles liked to have things happen and it was also General Smith's preference.

One good example of the way that practice deviated from the written directives can be found in the provisions relating to the production of National Intelligence Surveys. NSCID 3 defined basic intelligence, as follows:

that factual intelligence which results from the collation of encyclopedic in-

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formation of a more or less permanent or static nature and general interest which, as a result of evaluation and interpretation, is determined to be the best available.

The CIA was to make an outline of the types of basic intelligence required by the Government -- of course "in collaboration with the appropriate agencies" -- and was to *coordinate* the production, publication, and dissemination. But the actual *production* of the material was to be allotted to the various departments

best qualified by reason of their intelligence requirements, production capabilities, and dominant interest

to do the job. A general description of dominant interests was included which carefully preserved the interests of the Department of State and the services. Political, cultural, and sociological intelligence was to be the responsibility of State; military intelligence was assigned to the Army, naval intelligence to the Navy, and air intelligence to the Air Force. The production of economic, scientific, and technological intelligence was the responsibility of "Each agency in accordance with its respective needs." Thus, no department could feel that its toes had

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been stepped on. True, the NSCID provided that changes in allocations could be made by agreement of the DCI and the agencies concerned. The thrust of the directive, however, was to make CIA a service agency which pulled together substantive work done by others. DCID's affecting the production of foreign economic intelligence and of scientific and technical intelligence were issued in subsequent years. In the 1958 revision of the NSCID's, NSCID 3 (21 April 1958), which deals with coordination of intelligence production, repeated much of the 1948 version. The only important change is that CIA was for the first time given by an NSCID primary responsibility for a major field of intelligence production, namely economic intelligence on the Sino-Soviet Bloc and scientific and technical intelligence "as a service of common concern." But this assignment had been previously agreed to within the community almost four years previously and embodied in DCID 15/1 (14 September 1954). 7/

As has been noted, the Department of State never had the funds to carry out its assigned

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responsibilities to the intelligence community -- for example, the production of its share of NIS material. CIA therefore footed much of the bill. As the fiscal year used to draw to a close, it became very difficult for State to agree to make full contributions to National Estimates since all their men, they would say, were deeply involved in finishing up their quota of contributions to the NIS program. Nevertheless, the documents continued to give State heavy responsibilities for the production of intelligence. Finally, in March 1961, State decided to give up the effort and to relinquish any responsibility for contributions to the NIS program. CIA took on a good many of State's assignments and others were parcelled out to other government departments. The CIA reported to the PFIAB that

The State responsibility, in effect since the inception of the NIS program and financially supported by CIA, included production and maintenance of NIS in the sociological and political fields worldwide, and in the non-Bloc economic field and constituted some 40% of the total NIS production. A major portion of this responsibility was re-allocated to a new research division in the Office of Basic

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Intelligence, CIA. Other segments were reallocated to the Office of Research and Reports, CIA, and to the Departments of Commerce, of Labor, and of Health, Education and Welfare. Under separate arrangements, responsibility for NIS biographical intelligence was reallocated from State to the Office of Central Reference, CIA. It was provided that State collection facilities and support would continue to be available.

Although administrative responsibility was assumed by CIA as of the beginning of FY 1962, it was agreed to continue NIS production by the existing CIA supported staff in State until after the October move of OBI to the new CIA Headquarters. 8/

There was no hint of the impending shift of responsibilities in the revision of NSCID 3 (18 January 1961), although the shift had undoubtedly been discussed between State and CIA. The revised NSCID 3, which is still in force (1973), repeated the assignment made to CIA or responsibility for economic intelligence on the Sino-Soviet Bloc and scientific and technical intelligence, but left with State the balance of economic intelligence and political and sociological intelligence. Revisions of the DCID's have not reflected the changes reported in the above

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quotation from the DCI's report to the PBCFIA. DCID 3/1 (23 April 1965), which is also still in effect (1973), provides that

Production of all economic intelligence on foreign countries outside the Sino-Soviet Bloc [an obsolete term after the Sino-Soviet break] is the responsibility of the Department of State except as indicated in paragraph 2a(1).

This last reference is to Defense responsibility for military-economic production. DCID 3/1 quoted above does not do to the actual changes in responsibility for NIS production, but very gently and in such a way as not to raise bureaucratic hackles. It says, in paragraph 2c:

The existing allocations of production responsibility for National Intelligence Surveys (NIS) are not changed by this Directive even though such allocations may, in some instances, be at variance with department or agency responsibilities specified in paragraph 2a.

This NIS program was only one of several affected by the allocation of production responsibilities. Contributions to NIE's were similarly affected. If only State had been concerned, the factual change in the situation might well have been reflected in the documents. After all, State had carried on these

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economic production functions with CIA money. There was force in the argument that an agency could not deal with the economics of the Communist countries without being concerned with their trading partners and their aid programs in the rest of the world. State had decided that it wanted to give up responsibility for economic intelligence production, and anyway it was the traditional attitude of State to be concerned with "political" matters and to view economics as an inferior subject. 9/*

It is probable that the failure of the directives to correspond with the actual situation arose out of the delicacy of relations between CIA and Defense in military-economic matters. The documents reflected the fact that both the Air Force and Army had built up staffs to deal with the economic aspects of military problems. The Navy had done so to a much smaller extent. But when SAC moved the targeting function to Omaha and much of the foreign air intelligence was produced by Air Force personnel in Dayton, Ohio, what

* In the mid-1960's, after Dulles retired, CIA's ORR took on the responsibility for producing economic intelligence for the whole world, although the DCID was not amended.

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remained in Washington was not very impressive. The Army cut down its economic staff, retaining a capability in logistics and some other fields. At the same time, CIA's ORR, with its mandate for production of economic intelligence on the Sino-Soviet Bloc, recruited and established a highly competent economic staff whose usefulness and superiority soon became evident. This shift became very apparent in the preparation of national estimates on Soviet military capabilities. In the meetings on estimates dealing with the Soviet bomber fleet, which were spirited and important in the middle 1950's, it was abundantly clear that the men in ORR had made more thorough analyses and knew their subject more thoroughly than anyone from the services. H. Randolph Payne, then of ORR, almost knew every Soviet heavy bomber by tail number. The role of the various CIA components grew in importance, and relations between CIA analytical personnel and their opposite numbers in the Pentagon were generally good.

It was quite a different thing, however, to change basic directives, whether NSCID's or DCID's.

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The battle over the formation of GMIC, which has been dealt with at length earlier,* showed how tenaciously the services clung to statements of responsibilities enshrined in formal documents. And it was not in Dulles's method of operation to force issues or to insist on written confirmations of *de facto* situations which were satisfactory in practice.

Thus one finds that while the role of the Agency under the general rubric of *services of common concern* has grown to large dimensions, the formal papers do not adequately reflect this growth.

* Volume II, Chapter 1, Section on Scientific Intelligence.

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Chapter 2

Protection of Intelligence Sources and MethodsThe Statutory Background

The provision of the National Security Act of 1947 which discusses the responsibility for protecting the security of intelligence sources and methods has caused difficulties for all DCI's; Dulles wrestled with it, as General Smith had before him, as have subsequent DCI's. The accepted interpretation of the Act and the procedures for operating under it were both established and changed while Dulles was DCI.

Section 102(d) (3) of the Act, after making it clear that the existing departments should produce and disseminate departmental intelligence, goes on

And provided further, That the Director of Central Intelligence shall be responsible for protecting intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure.

The literal interpretation of this clause would impose an impossible task on a DCI. When other departments and agencies are charged with most collection responsibilities, other than espionage, and with the pro-

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duction and dissemination of departmental intelligence, how could a DCI ensure the secrecy of their sources and methods without taking over supervision of all intelligence collection, production, and dissemination?

It is the memory of old-timers that the genesis of this clause of the Act was the fear of the military that civilians would not protect COMINT. The military during World War II had refused to disseminate COMINT to OSS on the grounds that the latter was insecure. With the creation of a centralized intelligence organization, it was clear that COMINT had to be distributed to the new organization. The clause of the Act was intended to place on the DCI the responsibility of guarding against the unauthorized disclosure by his people of this source and method of intelligence. 10/

This explanation is reinforced by that given by Dulles to the PBCFIA in February 1958. There was a discussion before that board of the revisions then being made of the NSCID's. L. B. Kirkpatrick's memorandum of the meeting states in part, in reference to the DCI's responsibility to protect sources and methods, as follows;

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it was stressed that this originated with the military who wanted to be sure that a civilian agency would protect the military agencies's sources and methods. This was put in the original executive order [of President Truman setting up the CIG in 1946] and carried forward into the law. 11/

Dulles in his book *The Craft of Intelligence* says,

Furthermore, this particular provision of the law, as the history of the legislation shows, was primarily intended to place upon the Director of Central Intelligence responsibility to see to the security of his own operations. 12/

This quotation comes after a reference to the fact that the National Security Act specifically provides that the DCI shall exercise no internal security functions. This last prohibition would theoretically prevent his investigating security problems in other departments or even, in an extreme interpretation, within CIA itself. 13/

The Early Directives

The first formal directive in this field was NSCID 11 (6 January 1950) issued during General Smith's directorship. It recognized that the various departments and agencies had to police their own organizations and that the DCI's responsibility was to

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coordinate policies concerning the protection of intelligence sources and methods, within the limits established by Section 102 of the National Security Act of 1947, except where provision has already been made by the National Security Council.

The last phrases seem to have little substantive meaning and are probably vestigial remainders of the days when the established departments looked with jaundiced eyes on the upstart CIA and were anxious to prevent its interfering with their internal affairs. It might also be noted that this directive had a paragraph which appears rather quaint in retrospect. Paragraph 4 reads:

In order to protect, intelligence sources and methods further, any reference to the Central Intelligence Agency should emphasize its duties as the coordinator of intelligence, rather than its secret intelligence activities. No reference will be made to this agency whatsoever unless it is unavoidable, of course.

NSCID 11 remained in force until the general revision and consolidation of NSCID's undertaken by General Truscott in 1957-58. At this time, NSCID 11 became Paragraph 17 of NSCID 1 in the 21 April 1958 version. In the course of working out these revisions, the substance of the statutory responsibility

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was reconsidered. In the record of Dulles's meeting with the PBCFIA on 28 February 1958, at which the NSCID revisions were discussed, Dulles, as has been said, explained that the genesis of the provision was the desire of the military to be sure that civilians would protect the intelligence which the services collected. The report of the meeting said that paragraph 17 of the revised NSCID 1 as drafted

implied that the DCI did not have full responsibility for protecting sources and methods because of the words "in consultation" [with the IAC.] There then followed a lengthy discussion of the DCI's responsibility ... [at this point Dulles explained the genesis of the statutory provision.] The Board agreed that efforts should be taken to clarify the DCI's responsibilities in this regard, because apparently the President as well as themselves felt it was a specific responsibility of the Director, but they indicated they might make a report in this regard. The DCI stressed the fact that he did not want responsibility for protecting sources and methods in other agencies inasmuch as he regarded that responsibility as impractical and impossible. General Cassidy pointed out that our General Counsel in the book of laws certainly implied that this was the DCI's responsibilities [sic]. 14/

Sentences were added to the draft of paragraph 17 specifically charging each department and agency

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with the responsibility of protecting sources and methods in its own organization.

The Expanded Directive

When the NSCID's were again being revised in the summer of 1958, primarily to sanction the merger of the IAC and USCIB into USIB, the substance of paragraph 17 of NSCID 1 of 21 April 1958 became paragraph 5 of the new NSCID 1. But a significant change was made. Whereas paragraph 17 of the April version made the DCI responsible for policies and procedures for the protection of intelligence sources and methods, the new paragraph 5 of the 15 September 1958 version made him responsible for the development of policies and procedures "for the protection of *intelligence and* of intelligence sources and methods." (emphasis added)

This was no casual change. NSCID 11 (6 January 1950), which was the first spelling out of the statutory provision, after specifying certain things which were to be included by the phrase "intelligence sources and methods" went on to provide "but the phrase does not include intelligence as such, the

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dissemination of which is already covered by appropriate departmental and agency security regulations." Thus it was specifically provided that the DCI had no general responsibility for the protection of intelligence as such from unauthorized disclosure. Again one sees evidence of the self-protective reflexes of the established departments which were guarding against encroachments by the new CIA. There may have been some grounds for these reflexes. In the immediate postwar period, there had been suggestions that there should be a centralized security organization in the US Government and that it should be located in the NIA and CIG, predecessors of CIA. 15/ The language in the new paragraph 5 of the September 1958 version of NSCID 1 was mild enough, since it merely told the DCI to ensure the development of policies and procedures; it specifically charged the respective departments and agencies with the duty of protecting intelligence and sources and methods in their own organizations. Nevertheless, the DCI's duties were expanded into a new field. Exactly when this change was introduced into the revisions of NSCID 1 and why it was introduced does not appear

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from the written Agency records available to the author. It is clear, however, that it arose out of the concern, shared strongly by President Eisenhower, over leaks which disclosed intelligence findings even though sometimes they did not necessarily disclose sources and methods.

There was one leak in early 1958 which had particularly galled the President, as well as Dulles, and did real harm to US intelligence. It may well have been the direct cause of the change in the NSCID. Jack Raymond in the *New York Times* for 31 January 1958 wrote a story, datelined Washington 30 January, which bore the headline, "Soviets' Biggest Satellite Reported in Countdown." The piece said "The Russians, in their preparation to launch the huge rocket, were reported to have begun at least one countdown." This disclosed, of course, that the US was, through electronic eavesdropping, listening to what was going on at the Soviet launch complex at Tyura Tam -- a very serious breach of security. Tyura Tam was the complex at which the burgeoning Soviet ICBM program was being tested, and no subject of intelligence was of greater importance to the United States.

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The Soviet practice had been to transmit by radio the last eight hours of a countdown. This transmission was among other things, designed to keep the instrumentation and tracking stations down-range advised of the state of the test proceedings so that they would be ready to function and follow the flight when the vehicle was launched. While much of the substance of the transmissions was encoded and not readable, US COMINT was able to monitor the proceedings to a considerable extent. Aside from the information derived from the radio transmissions themselves, the United States used the occasion to bring other intelligence systems into play. The eight-hour warning of a launch gave time enough to alert the U-2 base at Adana, Turkey, where a pilot and plane could be made ready to take off and fly a pattern from which the pilot could record the telemetry associated with the actual launch.

The eight hours of warning was also a key element in the planning for monitoring the impact of a missile in the Kamchatka area, using a plane which would be flying in the vicinity. The plan for this

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operation, the plane for which was the specially configured and outfitted Boeing 707 known as the Nancy Rae, called for the plane to operate from Eileson Air Force Base in mainland Alaska. Such a plan was quite feasible with eight hours warning.

After the revelation that the US was reading the countdown, the Soviets promptly curtailed their transmissions to the last four hours before launch. Four hours did not give the United States enough time to get a U-2 and pilot airborne (the pilot had to have several hours in an oxygen environment before he could safely take off to operate at U-2 altitudes) and in position to gather the ELINT from the launched vehicle. Likewise, the Nancy Rae would not be able to fly from the Alaskan base to the area from which it could monitor the impact area. As a result of this last factor, it became necessary to reconstruct the airfield at Shemya, at the westernmost end of the Aleutian Island chain, so that it could serve as the base for the Nancy Rae. Work on a radar installation at Shemya had begun, but the airfield there could only accept lighter, slower planes. The rebuilding of the air

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field and installation of a heated hangar cost some \$18 million and delayed the operational date for the Nancy Rae.

The countdown reported by the *New York Times* was in fact not a space shot: it was an ICBM test. This made no difference. The point was that the "leak", the breach of security, resulted in the almost immediate loss of major intelligence sources on a subject which was at the top of the national priorities for intelligence. 16/

A thorough investigation of this breach of security was made, including damage assessments, but the cat was out of the bag and the investigation served little real function.

Dulles sent a memorandum to the President describing the results of the investigation of this case. 17/ On 29 January 1958, there had been indications in COMINT that were interpreted as meaning that Sputnik III was soon to be launched from Tyura Tam. Mr. Frederick Dearborn, who was the Special Assistant to the President who dealt with Operations Coordination Board matters, conferred with a working group of the

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OCB on the question of whether the US should take some of the wind out of the sails of the USSR by announcing the impending launch before the Soviets did. Some of the members of the working group were not cleared for COMINT and hence were not told why the subject came up. At any rate, there was no agreement to an announcement.

The next morning, General Cabell, in the absence of Dulles, notified the NSC of the Soviet preparations at 0900, at its regular meeting. At 1045, GMIC informed the community that in its opinion a countdown was under way. Dearborn again consulted the OCB working group and consulted officials in State, Defense, and CIA. Most of them opposed any release or attempt to exploit the warning. Dr. James R. Killian, who was President Eisenhower's Special Assistant for Science and Technology, and Mr. Dearborn finally agreed to recommend to the White House an after-the-fact congratulatory announcement. In fact, the Soviets never announced the shot; it was an ICBM test, not Sputnik III.

So this was a case in which a large number of

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people knew of the indications of a launch, many of whom did not know of the source of the intelligence. Dulles's conclusion to the President was that an exhaustive investigation produced no factual proof that any official disclosed COMINT intelligence to the *New York Times*, that a large number of people were involved in discussion of a possible advance release, and that not much could be done to protect intelligence in such circumstances when so many people were easily available to press representatives who were very skillful in piecing together snippets of information. "The present case, as this report indicates, involved very unusual elements where an innocent mistake or indiscretion was probably the contributing factor to the unfortunate leak which occurred," wrote Dulles to the President.

There was another factor which contributed to the enlargement of the DCI's responsibility. With the growth of community efforts and of community intelligence issuances, particularly those based on technical collection and analysis, it became more and more artificial to try to designate either

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positive intelligence or sources and methods as pertaining to one department or agency alone. Increasingly, the intelligence was a product of cooperative action and became community intelligence. With this development, there arose a necessity to assign the responsibility for protection to one central point, and this logically was the DCI as chairman of the community. The idea of charging each department with the protection of "its own intelligence" became less useful. 18/

Intermediate drafts of the revisions of the 21 April 1958 version of NSCID 1 were reviewed in the NSC, with President Eisenhower present in August, 1958. General Truscott's memorandum of that meeting reads, in part,

Mr. Gray* also raised the question with reference to paragraph 5 on page 10 as not reflecting the authority which previous discussion of this item indicated that it was desired the DCI exercise, there being no indication as to whom the reports [on unauthorized disclosures] were to be made or recommendations for

* Gordon Gray, Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs.

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corrective measures. Mr. Dulles indicated that he had no authority to investigate within other departments and that the heads of departments and agencies should make their own reports. The President indicated that serious unauthorized disclosures should be brought to his attention. 19/

So paragraph 5 of NSCID 1 was elaborated. The final version (15 September 1958) provided that the DCI, "with the assistance and support of the members" of the USIB was to ensure the development of policies and procedures. Each department and agency was, however, to remain responsible for the protection of intelligence and of sources and methods within its own organization. Each should establish internal policies and procedures. The DCI was to call on them to investigate internally any unauthorized disclosure. A report of these investigations, "including corrective measures taken or recommended," was to be transmitted to the DCI for review and "such further action as may be appropriate," including reports to the NSC or the President. This paragraph was still essentially unchanged in 1973.*

* Effective 17 February 1972, paragraph 5 became paragraph 7 and a new paragraph 7a was added instructing the DCI, with the advice and assistance of USIB, to establish procedures for the review of classified intelligence information, the disclosure of which was to be authorized.

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On 26 September 1958, Gordon Gray sent a memorandum to the DCI in which he outlined the procedure which the President desired to be followed in the case of investigations. 20/ If, after review, the DCI felt that Presidential action was required, the reports of investigations should be submitted directly to the President "unless they involve a policy matter appropriate for consideration by the NSC." When an investigation was started, the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs was to be advised and kept informed of the progress of the investigation; a copy of each report of an investigation was to be given to that Special Assistant, who was also to be advised of any disposition the DCI made of the case. In other words, the White House was to be cut in on all cases of unauthorized disclosures; they were not to be kept within the intelligence community alone.

This procedure was followed in January 1959 when *Time* magazine published a piece which described the technique for measuring the radioactive Krypton 85 in the atmosphere as a means of estimating Soviet

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plutonium production. This was a very secret [REDACTED] intelligence method. The author of the article was described in the magazine as having been on duty in the Pentagon for 26 months as the *Time* military correspondent. Dulles sent a memorandum to the Defense, Joint Staff, Army, Navy, and Air Force members of the USIB instructing them to investigate this unauthorized disclosure. 21/ A copy of the instruction was sent to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs.

Thus there existed a situation in which Dulles had responsibilities for protecting from unauthorized disclosure not only intelligence sources and methods but also the intelligence product itself. While he did not have policing powers extending into other departments and agencies, it was clear that President Eisenhower was much concerned about leaks and was looking to Dulles to do something and that the White House wanted to be kept intimately informed about what went on. Quite apart from the personal interest of President Eisenhower, Dulles was deeply concerned with this matter. He had a keen sense of what can be called, for lack of a better phrase, "public relations." He saw clearly that he and the Agency

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would be vulnerable to the charge of slipshod practices when intelligence information was disclosed, no matter where or how the disclosure occurred.

The USIB Security Committee

Since paragraph 5 of NSCID 1 laid on the USIB members the duty of lending the DCI "assistance and support," Dulles decided to propose a USIB committee on security and to try to extend its field of operation as widely as possible. In this proposal he had the immense advantage of having as heads of his own security office two experienced and respected officers, Colonel Sheffield Edwards and Robert Bannerman, respectively Director and Deputy Director of the Office of Security. They believed, as did Dulles, that by patient negotiation and demonstrations of effectiveness, it would be possible to establish common practices and mutual cooperation in wide areas.

Dulles circulated to USIB members on 4 February 1959 a memorandum enclosing a draft DCID. 22/ This directive called for a Security Committee of USIB to recommend standards, policies, and procedures; to consider specific cases of unauthorized disclosures; and to make what came to be called "damage assessments."

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The draft DCID was worked on interdepartmentally and finally approved as DCID 1/11 (24 March 1959). 23/ It remained unchanged until 23 April 1965, and in 1973 still forms the basic charter of the Security Committee (IBSEC), which has as its chairman the Director of Security of CIA. In his report to the PBCFIA covering the period 1 October 1958 to 3 March 1959 Dulles mentioned the creation of IBSEC and commented that the CIA Office of Security had already conducted five investigations of unauthorized disclosures. 24/

After an initial period in which the security representatives of other departments exhibited a considerable degree of wariness, IBSEC became an effective body, covering many fields of common interest. 25/ It investigated specific cases of leaks and made full reports, including recommendations for security procedures. The matters it considered were sometimes suggested by USIB, sometimes by Dulles himself, but most often by the committee chairman. As its usefulness was demonstrated, as trust in its effectiveness grew, and as the wariness of its members was softened, its field of activity expanded, and it made annual reports on its activities

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to USIB.* Its various reports were sent to the White House, pursuant to the instructions in Gordon Gray's memorandum to Dulles. 26/

IBSEC did not get into the matter of the personnel security procedures of other departments and agencies. The number of people singed or burnt during the McCarthy days elevated this aspect of security to a very sensitive level. Each agency and department jealously guarded its own personnel security procedures. There was only one area in which CIA imposed its own security standards both with regard to personnel and intelligence. This was the TALENT system covering all aspects of the U-2 project and its product. In this case the project was financed and operated by CIA in its early phases, and the community recognized the Agency's claim to handle all matters of clearance and the distribution of documents and photography.

It is unfortunate, but true, that the results of investigations of unauthorized disclosures have

*. These reports bear the legend "IBSEC-AR-X", X being the number of the report. They are on file with the USIB Secretariat.

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not been rewarding. Dulles in his book *The Craft of Intelligence* discusses this subject. 27/ He had many experiences of such disclosures ranging from the printing in a column by Joseph Alsop of the conclusions of an NIE to the defection of NSA employees, Martin and Mitchell in 1960. The investigations, and the resulting improvement of the rules, procedures, and policies governing the handling of sensitive intelligence undoubtedly reduced the incidence of unauthorized disclosure, but once this horse was out of the stable, there was little that could be done except to change the padlocks and reinforce the rules about their use. Dulles's discussion of the problem, referred to above, is realistic, informed, and discouraging. He concludes his comments on his own experience by saying

I have to admit, and do so with a mixture of regret and sadness, that during my years of service in the CIA I did not succeed in making much progress in this field. I did not find an acceptable and workable formula for tightening up our governmental machinery or slowing down the tempo of frustrating leaks of sensitive information of value to a potential enemy. For one must do this in the face of the understandable but sometimes uncontrolled yen of the press to know everything.

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Others who have labored in this vineyard report that it was common for an investigation to find either that so many people were privy to the information that it was impossible to pin down who might have leaked it -- as was the case in the disclosure of the reading of the Soviet countdown referred to above -- or that the trail led to a senior official who had made a "calculated leak" or who was, as a practical matter, virtually invulnerable. It was this inconclusiveness of investigations that led J. Edgar Hoover to establish the policy that the FBI would not undertake an investigation of a leak from within the government unless directed to do so by the President.

Purposeful leaks were sometimes the result of a firm conviction by the person making the leak that the public disclosure of particular information was strongly in the national interest. Undoubtedly other leaks were deliberately designed to further the special interests of a department, or section of a department, in a struggle for budget appropriations. Some such leaks regarding Soviet military capabilities came from defense contractors who, being privy to

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sensitive information, were anxious to promote business for their companies. Some leaks were the result of carelessness. In many cases, leaks came from the conjunction of the investigatory skill of some members of the press and the vanity or inexperience of the informant. It often takes a good deal of stamina to withstand some press techniques.

The writer was present on two occasions when senior agency officials were subjected to the skills of Joseph Alsop. After a formal dinner in the late 1950's, the writer found himself in a conversational group consisting of Joseph Alsop, General Cabell, and himself. It was one of those occasions when Alsop was riding some defense subject, such as bombers or missiles, and crying doom. He obviously thought General Cabell a juicy target and started on his technique of making statements about Soviet capabilities which he hoped General Cabell would confirm, contradict, or at least comment on. General Cabell did nothing of the sort. To Alsop's statements, he would reply with, at most, "That's a very interesting point of view." Alsop got more and more frustrated because his technique had so often worked -- particularly on

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someone who was not averse to showing how much he knew. His voice rose higher and higher, his statements became more and more outrageous. General Cabell became, if anything, more detached. The conversation broke up in a very chilly atmosphere. When the writer later congratulated General Cabell on his imperturbability, he said, "I was just looking out of the window."

A comparable situation had occurred some time earlier, although the cast of characters was different, as was the locale. The latter was the house of Stewart Alsop, and there was present a senior CIA official as well as the writer and a number of other people. Again Joseph Alsop wanted some information, again he made extravagant statements in the hope that they would be contradicted or at least commented on. But this time it worked. The CIA official did comment and contradict and in the course of doing so, disclosed information which he should not have mentioned. The next day the writer was called by a woman who had been present and whose husband had been an Agency officer. She said in substance, "Did you hear what went on last

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night, and can't you do something to keep that man from talking so much?" Another person who had been at the dinner telephoned Dulles and reported on the occasion, mentioning that the writer had been there. Dulles called the writer to his office and asked about the evening. The writer has been informed that the officer was disciplined by Dulles personally. He was, however, a very valuable officer to Dulles, and he was not removed from his job. It is doubtful that in this instance Alsop got any information he did not already know or suspect, but he probably got confirmation and could add that to his previous knowledge to buttress the particular campaign he was then waging.

These instances prove nothing except that it is very easy for an informed person, in an informal atmosphere of friendliness, to succumb to the skilled techniques of a newsman whose own motives may be a complicated mixture of a sincere conviction that a certain subject should be aired to the public, a desire to astound his readers by his knowledge of "inside" information, and a wish to impress his editors with his value as a reporter. So long as we have a

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free press, unbridled by either outside sanctions or internal restraints, leaks will occur and investigations and reports will not stop them. Dulles in the chapter of his book referred to above discusses the stringent British Official Secrets Act and the security restrictions accepted by the British media. He concludes, as others have also, that it is highly unlikely that any effective sanction can be adopted in the United States which would materially inhibit the public media from disclosing material which, from the "sources and methods" point of view, can be seriously damaging to US interests. The recent case of the Pentagon Papers reinforces this conclusion.

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Chapter 3

Liaison with Foreign Intelligence Services

Liaison with foreign intelligence and security services is the responsibility of CIA, subject to certain specific exceptions. The general responsibility of CIA for such liaison was apparently taken for granted, however, and not spelled out in official directives until the 1958 revisions of the NSCID's. This was a time when a major effort was made to delineate the ground rules for foreign espionage and counter-espionage as between the military services and CIA, a subject which has been treated above.*

In NSCID 5 (21 April 1958), the directive on this subject, it was provided:

3. The Central Intelligence Agency has primary responsibility for U.S. clandestine activities abroad. Subject to the provisions of paragraph 8, [dealing with wartime] it is responsible for the following services of common concern: ...

* Volume II, Chapter 2, section on "Agreed Activities."

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c. The conduct of liaison with foreign clandestine services or concerning the above clandestine activities with foreign intelligence or security services [the "above activities" being espionage and counter-espionage]. 28/

NSCID 5 also authorized departments or agencies with commands or installations located outside the United States and its possessions, to conduct supplementary espionage in order to satisfy departmental intelligence needs and clandestine counterintelligence necessary for the security of their personnel, commands, activities, and installations. It also authorized them to conduct liaison with foreign intelligence or security services concerning these authorized activities. This authority was, however, subject to the general mandate given by the directive to the DCI, "To ensure centralized direction" of all the activities authorized by the directive through "prior, comprehensive, and continuing coordination." Subsequent versions of NSCID 5 have altered this language very little.

To underscore the concept, the revision of 17 February 1972 added the further instruction, "after appropriate consultation." *

* Paragraph 2a of the 1972 revision also prescribed that in the coordination process, the risk of clandestine operations be compared with the value of the activity.

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The directives relative to COMINT and ELINT both prior and subsequent to the 1958 revision of the NSCID's had put the responsibility for liaison in these special fields on the DCI, subject to one specific exception. NSCID 6 (15 September 1958) provided that the DCI, with the technical advice and assistance of the Director of NSA, was to be the executive agent of the Government for COMINT and ELINT [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

While NSCID 5 purported to deal with liaison in connection with clandestine intelligence and counter-intelligence activities, it applied, in substance, to all intelligence liaison. Only CIA had a mission of covert action, and such liaison abroad as pertained to that field was naturally carried on by CIA, whether that liaison was carried on by the stations in the field or with foreign liaison officers in Washington.

Dulles was much interested in liaison with foreign services and encouraged its establishment where possible. On his trips around the world, he made a point

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of meeting and keeping in touch with the chiefs of the intelligence services in the countries he visited, and he also made a practice of seeing high-ranking intelligence officers when they made trips to the United States -- trips which he encouraged and, in some cases, financed when such officials were invited to pay a visit to Washington. Such an interest was wholly in keeping with Dulles's personality. He liked people and generally found professional intelligence officers congenial. It was also part of his temperament to value human contacts and to believe that good personal relations would facilitate cooperation and the obtaining of useful information through them. When the matter of leaks of intelligence information arose in Washington, one of his great worries was that such leaks would impede the flow of information from friendly foreign services who would question the adequacy of US security.


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
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It is not possible to make meaningful generalizations about liaison with foreign services. The nature and extent of such liaison varied immensely in accord with a number of factors, including the climate of political relations between the US and the country involved, the personalities on both sides -- in Washington and in the field -- the mutuality of interest between the two countries, the objectives of US policy, and the temperament and opinion of the relevant headquarters officers. Intelligence relations did not follow a straight line in the case of any country. They have been described as a series of sine curves, now up, now down. 30/


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


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Sometimes the inter-service liaison in the field was quite formal and not particularly active or rewarding, but often it was both of these, transcending service-to-service relations and involving dealings with other parts of the host government. When it was a question of establishing or maintaining an intelligence installation in a foreign country, dealing with the local intelligence service seldom was enough. Negotiations of at least the principles governing the case would usually involve the incumbent political leaders of the country concerned. [REDACTED]

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
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Thus intelligence relationships in many cases were an integral and important part of the totality of US relations with a number of countries, and in many cases the arranging and maintenance of intelligence relations brought Dulles into the position of participant in US foreign relations.

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In view of the close identification of foreign liaison with general foreign relations, the occasion for policy guidance from appropriate US officials often arose. In some cases, this guidance was provided by the ambassador in the field. Often it came through the continuous contact which the DDP area division maintained with the State Department.* In some cases, where a large expenditure of funds or a major issue of principle was involved, Dulles would take the matter up with the designated 5412 representatives.**

* See Volume III, Chapter 1.

** See Volume III, Chapter 2.

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In any event, the DCI and the CIA, through their foreign liaison activities, participated actively in the conduct of US foreign relations and the support of US foreign policy.

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Chapter 4

Strengthening the DCI's Hand

Dulles was under continuous pressure, as had been indicated earlier, to act more aggressively and to exert more authority in insuring the coordination of the community. These pressures obviously did not come from the members of the community. Enough has been written above to show the resistance to coordination which existed, whether it was in the production of coordinated intelligence or in the coordination of activities. The pressures came from other sources that were not responsible for day-to-day activities -- chiefly the two advisory boards that were set up by Presidents Eisenhower and Kennedy. One view they appeared to hold was that Dulles had too much to do in both managing the CIA and supervising the community. Their recommendations to meet this point fell into two general categories, first, that Dulles should create a post of general manager who would relieve him of many of his continuing daily responsibilities in CIA, thus giving him more time

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to deal with larger issues, or second, that the role of the DCI should be separated from that of managing the Agency by putting the DCI on the White House Staff and assigning another officer to run the CIA.

Dulles was consistently opposed to both these suggestions. There were two reasons for his opposition. He did not believe that they would work. He believed a general manager would only be a fifth wheel who could not relieve him of responsibility but would be an unnecessary impediment to an orderly carrying out of his duties. The separation of the DCI from the CIA would, he thought, merely create a new and redundant governmental unit, since a DCF in the White House staff would need the support of a large organization, an organization which would duplicate substantial parts of CIA. Aside from his belief that these measures would not work, he was clearly temperamentally disinclined to separate himself from day-to-day contact with the intelligence operations which he so loved, particularly the activities of the Clandestine Services. A closer examination of these proposals will bring out the difficulties they raised and Dulles's opposition to them.

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The PBCFIA made its first report to the President on 20 December 1956. 32/ The tenth of ten recommendations made by the Board read as follows:

To relieve the Director of Central Intelligence of the many management responsibilities he is presently called upon to discharge as Head of the Central Intelligence Agency, we suggest that he be provided with a Chief of Staff or Executive Director who would act as his "Executive Vice-President." This assistance would thereby enable him to direct his efforts more toward the integration, reduction of duplication, and coordination that is necessary within the national intelligence effort.

This was no new idea: It had appeared in the report of the Hoover Commission to the Congress in June 1955. This report was based on the work of the task force under General Mark W. Clark which had reviewed the operations of CIA, primarily the overt side. 33/

All the recommendations of the PBCFIA were, at the direction of the President, circulated for comment to the statutory members of the National Security Council; the Secretary of the Treasury; the Director of the Bureau of the Budget; the Chairman,

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Joint Chiefs of Staff; and the Director of Central Intelligence. 34/ PBCFIA's suggestion for implementing Recommendation 10 was

Refer to the Director of Central Intelligence for recommendation to the President as to the best method of accomplishing the purpose of this recommendation.

Dulles was, as has been said, wholly opposed to the idea of an Executive Director as were all the principal officers of CIA except Lyman B. Kirkpatrick, the Inspector General. But it was not Dulles's way simply to oppose. If the President's Board thought more attention should be paid to coordination, he would appoint a senior deputy to concern himself principally with that function. So he proposed to create the position of Deputy Director for Coordination and to appoint General Lucian K. Truscott to fill it. Dulles made this proposal at the end of a long memorandum to the President in which he stated the reasons why he felt that the appointment of an Executive Director or Chief of Staff would not achieve the objectives sought by the President's Board. 35/ This memorandum brings out so clearly the way Dulles saw his job that

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it is worth summarizing. The memorandum was actually drafted by Truscott and amended by Cabell and Dulles, but it was obviously the product of detailed discussions and clearly represents Dulles's views. The main points of the memorandum follow:

(1) Management functions are already delegated to three Deputy Directors, with well defined areas of responsibility, except where the DCI is required by law to act personally or must act for reasons of morale, welfare, and operational efficiency.

(2) The Deputy Directors have immediate access to the DCI and DDCI at all times and to each other and their subordinates.

(3) There are staff meetings three times a week of all principal assistants which keep the DCI and the DDCI abreast of current problems and at which immediate decisions can be made.

(4) To insert another bureaucratic echelon into the organizational structure between the DCI and the DDCI and the principal operational deputies would require a very considerable change in the internal organization and staff procedures within the Agency. It would cause delay and increase administrative work and thus reduce effectiveness without improving coordination among them and without reducing management responsibilities which would be required of the DCI in any case.

(5) There are of necessity operations of specially sensitive or personal nature which require the personal attention of the DCI and DDCI and which no one else can perform.

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(6) There are certain functions outside the management functions which require the personal attention of the DCI or DDCI which cannot be delegated and which consume a very large amount of time and effort. These include Chairmanship of the IAC and USCIB, OCB affairs, briefing the President and the NSC, conferences with government officials and civil dignitaries, liaison with foreign officials and intelligence officers, contacts with Congress and the press, etc.

After mentioning a variety of fields in which greater integration and coordination should be accomplished -- for example, "agreed activities," communications intelligence, and research and development, -- Dulles went on to say, "In my opinion, the designation of a Chief of Staff or Executive Vice-President would not accomplish the purpose that the President's Board had in mind." He went on:

I believe that the most practicable and effective way to attain this objective would be:

a. To have the primary operational and management responsibilities as they are assigned at present In addition, I propose to designate an executive officer who will be responsible for coordinating staff-actions.

b. To designate a Deputy Director for Coordination who will have a minimum of management responsibilities within the Agency and to provide him with the necessary assistance, to charge this Deputy for

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Coordination with responsibility for continuous study and review of possibilities for increasing integration, reducing duplication, and improving coordination within the national intelligence effort in consultation with representatives of other intelligence agencies. I propose to designate General L. K. Truscott, Jr., Retired, for this office.

Dulles also designated John S. Earman, who was his Executive Assistant, to be his Executive Officer.

Truscott had a number of qualifications which made him particularly suitable. Most of the problems regarding coordination of activities arose in relation to the military services. The most vexing of these problems was that of "agreed activities" -- i.e., the coordination of the clandestine intelligence operations of the services in areas where US troops were stationed. Truscott had been appointed by General Walter Bedell Smith early in 1951 as Senior Representative (in fact, Chief of the CIA Station) in Germany where the "agreed activities" problem was the most acute. There he was chairman of the Intelligence Coordination Committee for Germany, which, as its name implies, was supposed to effect coordination in the field, and had firsthand experience with interagency

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problems. He had served in this CIA post for more than 3 years, until 1 October 1954, when he returned to CIA Headquarters. His familiarity with the practical problems in the field and his three-star rank put him into a particularly good position to deal with the services. In addition, Truscott had served with and under President Eisenhower and would have his personal support.

Dulles sent this memorandum via General Robert Cutler, President Eisenhower's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs. The latter passed it on to the President with a recommendation that the President approve Dulles's proposal, 36/ which the President did. Truscott was then appointed Deputy Director for Coordination on 1 July 1957. 37/ The formal communication to the President notifying him of Truscott's appointment was sent to Cutler 38/ together with a proposed directive from the President to the members of the NSC restating the need for a strong centralized direction of the US intelligence effort through the NSC and the DCI. The President approved the memorandum, which was circulated to the NSC members. It endorsed the

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need for a strong centralized direction of the intelligence effort ... through the National Security Council and the Director of Central Intelligence. The exercise of a more comprehensive and positive coordinative responsibility by the Director of Central Intelligence can be of the utmost value to the entire intelligence community and strengthen the national intelligence effort.

I have also concurred in the recommendation of the Director of Central Intelligence that he appoint a Deputy Director for Coordination This work [coordination] should be carried out in full consultation with the appropriate representatives of all our intelligence agencies. 39/

The memorandum went on to say, "All members of the intelligence community will render the Director of Central Intelligence the fullest possible cooperation in the accomplishment of this objective."

Dulles's letter to the President regarding Truscott's appointment had said:

In this capacity, General Truscott will be charged with the responsibility to review all possibilities for increasing integration, reducing duplication, and improving coordination in the national intelligence effort in consultation with the appropriate representatives of the various intelligence agencies of Government concerned. He will be responsible for the preparation of recommendation to me for such constructive measures as may be desirable and appropriate. General Truscott's long

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military service and his thorough familiarity with intelligence problems gained over the last six years with the Central Intelligence Agency at home and abroad equip him uniquely for his important duties.

The PBCFIA, and others who persistently supported the Executive Director-Chief of Staff concept, were not satisfied with the appointment of Truscott. The Board's stated objective had been to move the DCI from the day-to-day running of CIA into the field of interdepartmental coordination. What it got was the appointment of a man to concern himself with the interdepartmental work, which might give the DCI even more time to devote to his responsibilities other than coordination. They were, for the moment, powerless since President Eisenhower had approved Dulles's proposal and the naming of Truscott.

The President's Board clearly made its disappointment known to Cutler, apparently stressing the fact that the appointment of Truscott did nothing to provide for better management within CIA. Cutler sent Dulles a longhand memorandum on 10 July 1957, immediately after Dulles's letter to the President, in which he said:

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it is understood that the "Killian Committee"[*] proposes during the next few months to return to the subject of a more effective administration of the Central Intelligence Agency. The "Killian Committee" apparently does not consider that the designation by the DCI of an executive officer, responsible for coordinating staff actions of the present three Deputy Directors is an adequate solution to the problem of more effective administration of CIA. It is believed that the President is as concerned with this aspect of the Killian Committee's recommendations as with the coordination of all resources of the intelligence community. 40/

The Board did indeed come back to the Executive Director-Chief of Staff idea. On 1 December 1958, Truscott saw General Hull, who by that time was chairman of the PBCFIA.** Truscott reported to Dulles that he had said to Hull that he understood the Board was still considering the Chief of Staff idea, that he didn't think it was practicable, and would like to know, as one old soldier to another, what the Board had in mind. Hull said that the Board thought Truscott's

* The "Killian Committee" was a common name for the President's Board which had Dr. James Killian as its Chairman.

** A memorandum of the conversation was sent by General Truscott to Dulles. 41/

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appointment was a step in the right direction and was accomplishing something but that

the Board was still unanimous in the opinion that you [Dulles] carried far too much of a load personally and that far too much detail reached you without being properly staffed and coordinated beforehand.

Hull was loud in his praise of Dulles personally but thought

you [Dulles] were laying yourself open to criticism in Congress and elsewhere because of intelligence failures such as Iraq, Sudan, Indonesia, the Middle East and elsewhere, and concerning covert operations such as Indonesia, Philippines and elsewhere in South East Asia The Board is concerned that you may not be giving high enough priority and personal attention to the problems of intelligence collection, which is the reason for which the Agency was created.

Concerning Indonesia and such operations

He had the distinct impression that the decision to undertake many of these operations was a spur-of-the-moment off-the-cuff affair possibly arrived at in discussions between you and your brother. He doubted that they were properly staffed out in advance of decision He referred to many complaints that some of the senior governmental officers concerned had been asked to approve projects involving huge expenditures before they had any opportunity for preliminary study So far as the Agency was concerned, it was virtually a question of those responsible for the operation evaluating their own

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work and he thought unprejudiced opinion would be hard to come by under such conditions.

These remarks are had to reconcile with other views expressed by Hull during the same conversation:

Truscott asked about a recent DDP briefing and

General Hull said that he and General Doolittle had been most favorably impressed with the DDP presentation which they had just had recently. He thought the staff preparation and operational coordination and control of operations evidenced in the briefing was excellent. He did not think however that this answered the problem of freeing the Director from undesirable detail ... nor did it resolve the question of preliminary staff work and inter-agency coordination with regard to policy as a basis for decision. General Hull said the Board would probably mention this Chief of Staff idea to the President again, but they had no idea of pressing it. If the Director was still opposed, they would not raise the issue again.

Truscott ended his memorandum to the DCI saying:

It is my personal opinion that the Board feels that the cold war activities occupy an undue amount of time, effort and money in the Agency, at the expense of intelligence. They certainly believe that these operations occupy too much of your time. General Hull also referred several times to impending changes which he hoped would be beneficial. I steered clear of this subject but am almost certain that he

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had reference to Frank W.*

This conversation raises some intriguing questions. Where did Hull hear this talk about lack of coordination within CIA? It could not have been from the DDP; his own testimony quoted above shows that he believed there was "excellent staff preparation and operational coordination and control of operations." It is unlikely that Dulles himself, in his briefings of the Board, would have given the impression of inadequate staff planning. There were three aspects of Hull's remarks, and they became confused. The first was that within CIA, covert operations were not adequately planned and staffed; second, that the DCI spent too much time on covert operations to the detriment of intelligence collection; and third, that those who were charged with giving policy guidance did not have staffing adequate to their needs. Taking these in reverse order, it was indeed probably true that

* Meaning, of course, the appointment of a DDP to succeed Frank Wisner, since by this time it was quite clear that Wisner was unlikely to recover his health sufficiently to resume his job as DDP. Helms had been acting DDP and Dulles appointed Richard M. Bissell permanent DDP at the end of 1958.

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some of the "designated representatives" under NSC 5412 felt that they were asked to pass on projects which they did not understand and which they had had no staff help on, or time to consider.*

The second complaint -- i.e., that Dulles spent a disproportionate amount of time on clandestine operations -- was a valid one and it is possible, though doubtful, that the Board deduced it from Dulles's presentations to them or from governmental gossip. The third allegation about lack of internal coordination and staffing must have come from sources inside CIA.

One possible channel is from Lyman B. Kirkpatrick to J. Patrick Coyne, Executive Secretary of the Board. The relations between Kirkpatrick and Coyne were close; the members of the Board were all men who had other interests and responsibilities and, as a result, an active Executive Secretary could and did have an important influence on them. Kirkpatrick says frankly

* This matter was the subject of a separate PBCFIA recommendation (No. 5) and is discussed in Volume III, Chapter 2.

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in his book, *The Real CIA*, that the idea of an Executive Director had "always made sense" to him. 42/ John S. Earman, who was Dulles's Executive Officer, told this writer that Kirkpatrick wanted the job so badly "he could taste it." It might also be noted that Kirkpatrick was in charge of relations between the Agency and the Clark Task Force of the Hoover Commission in 1955 and that the idea of an Executive Director was surfaced there.

The PBCFIA prepared a set of recommendations which are dated 30 October 1958 although they were not apparently delivered to the President until 16 December. The IG obtained a copy "unofficially" and under a buck slip dated 15 December sent it to Dulles and Cabell. 43/ Part III of this document reads in part:

While this matter [functioning of DDP] is under study, we believe that the DCI should again give consideration to the appointment of a Chief of Staff (or Executive Assistant) for the Agency. We believe that such an assistant, supported by a top echelon staff, would serve not only to relieve him of many of his management burdens and thus free him for his coordinating and other high level duties, but would also help him regularize and enhance the organizational relationship of the Agency with the other departments and agencies of the government.

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The paper refers to the recommendation made on
20 December 1956.

Action on this recommendation resulted in the designation by the DCI of a Deputy Director for Coordination. While this has served good purposes, it does not, in our view, meet the need of the DCI for the executive assistance which we still believe he should have.

Kirkpatrick made a memo of a meeting of the PBCFIA (of which Hull was then Chairman) with the President on 16 December 1958 on the Board's report and recommendations. The relevant quotation is:

The President then raised the question of the Board's re-recommending a Chief of Staff for the Agency. There followed a general discussion of this. General Doolittle said that he felt that perhaps he had not been sufficiently tactful in making the original recommendation in this regard. General Hull stated that the Board was unanimous in still believing that this would be beneficial to the Agency. The President said that he had talked to the DCI on this subject not less than ten days ago.* 44/

* This memorandum also said

General Hull reported on the appointment of Mr. Bissell, indicating approval; of the elimination of the I & R Staff, indicating that the Board considered this a step forward, particularly inasmuch as this meant that the review function would now be passing to the Inspector General, where it should be. [N.B. This was Kirkpatrick's memo and he was Inspector General.]

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The President's action on the Board's recommendations regarding the Chief of Staff matter was "to be followed up personally with the Director of Central Intelligence." 45/

The subject seems to have been dropped for the time being. Truscott was succeeded by Brigadier General J. D. Balmer, who became Assistant Director (rather than Deputy Director) for Coordination on 1 July 1960. On 18 January 1961, pursuant to Recommendation 29 of the Joint Study Group (see later discussion), a coordination staff was created with the duties described in Recommendations 31-33.

Shortly after John McCone became DCI on 29 November 1961, he asked Kirkpatrick to work with Lieutenant General Marshall S. Carter (the new DDCI), General Cortlandt V. R. Schuyler (whom McCone had recruited for the job), and J. Patrick Coyne (of the NSC and PFIAB staffs) in making suggestions for a reorganization of the Agency. McCone had announced that he would look to the DDCI to run the Agency while he, as DCI, concentrated on his responsibility as Presidential advisor. During these discussions of organizational

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changes, Kirkpatrick obviously advanced the idea of an executive-director or chief of staff. In his diary for 29 March 1962, Kirkpatrick refers to a conversation with the DDCI on organizational matters.

He [General Carter] said he was convinced that there was a necessity for a chief of staff or Executive Director provided that Mr. McCone really meant what he said when he indicated that he wanted General Carter to run the Agency. He asked me if I would like the job and I told him I would provided he was certain there was a job, that it would work the way we had discussed it [note past tense] and that he wanted me to do it. 46/*

General Carter, brought up in the tradition of military organization, was of course sympathetic to the traditional military system of chiefs of staff. Kirkpatrick was appointed Executive Director shortly thereafter.** In his book *The Real CIA*, Kirkpatrick describes this appointment as coming as a surprise.

* General Cabell's comment in September 1970 to the author on the origin of and the response to the pressure from the President's Board for an Executive Director or Chief of Staff for the DCI is as follows:

This was apparently a one-man campaign in CIA itself, for not one other senior official was known to support the idea. All liked the arrangement under which the DCI (and DDCI) personally dealt with each of them without going through an executive director or chief of staff.

** 10 April 1962.

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~~SECRET~~Separation of DCI from CIA

Having found that his recommendation of an Executive Director-Chief of Staff was not going to be carried out by Dulles, the President's Board approached what it saw as the problem from a different tack.

The PBCFIA's Recommendation 33 to the President, of 4 October 1960 suggested that perhaps the DCI should be formally separated from the Agency and set up as a separate entity having the responsibilities of advising the President and coordinating the community. The PBCFIA was obviously not willing to make a positive recommendation of such a change, so it suggested

That the Director of Central Intelligence be requested to provide you [the President] and the Board with his views and recommendations as to: (a) the measures (legislative and/or executive) which would be required to insure strong centralized direction, coordination and integration of all U.S. foreign intelligence activities; (b) whether long-term, national security interests will best be served by continuing to vest in one official responsibility for coordinating all member agencies of the Intelligence Community together with responsibility for administering an operating agency which is a component and competing element of that Community. 47/

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Dulles's answer to this proposal* clearly set out his concept of coordination, the limits of his power, and his belief that he could not function adequately as DCI if cut off from the CIA. He made a number of separate points:

(1) Under existing arrangements, considerable progress had been made. While "at times, progress has been too slow," he felt it would be

impractical to vest over-all command authority for all intelligence operations in a director of central intelligence, whether located with the Central Intelligence Agency, or with the National Security Council, inasmuch as these operations are an integral and I believe necessary ingredient of the command structure of other departments of government.

(2) separation of the DCI from the CIA would result in the creation of a new agency, with all the problems of personnel and bureaucracy this would entail.

(3) If the DCI and a small personal staff were to be separated from the CIA, the DCI would have no facilities of his own to prepare him for briefing the President and the NSC but would have to rely on other agencies.

* See Historical Staff document HS/HC 877.

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I believe that anyone experienced in government recognizes that requests from another part of the government, regardless of the level, do not receive the same priority and attention as requests received from the immediate head of the agency or department.

Furthermore, the President would have to look to different people for briefings on intelligence and on covert action.

(4) If the DCI were separated from CIA, taking with him his estimates, current intelligence, coordinating and planning staffs, as had been explored by the Joint Study Group, he believed he would need around 500 people, "too big a number to have in the NSC or the White House."

(5) I think it is clear from the law that my authority for coordination is a recommending one and not a mandate. I recognize that thus far in our efforts we have tried to achieve coordination more through persuasion than through coercion or recourse to the NSC and, I recognize ... that more frequent recourse to the NSC on my part might have been desirable. I would point out, however, that the intelligence community is a closely knit family and is responsive to most requirements for better coordination, though I admit that sometimes the process of achieving it is long and laborious. Once achieved by persuasion rather than by fiat, the coordination is likely to develop more effectively than under orders which might be subject to evasion or delay in execution.

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(6) The thought that CIA was a competitor of other agencies and thus could not be an unprejudiced coordinator was a mistaken one. In the field of foreign clandestine operations, CIA's role was paramount, the activities of other agencies being "supplementary" under NSCID 5. The same was true regarding activities assigned to CIA as matters of "common concern." At any rate, the USIB had proved an effective mechanism for straightening out disagreements.

Gordon Gray, who was Special Assistant to President Eisenhower for National Security Affairs during the last two and a half years of his Presidency, attended two meetings between the President and Dulles during which the former pressed Dulles to assert more authority in the coordination of the intelligence community. Dulles made many of the arguments set forth in the letter above, particularly his lack of authority to order actions by departments having statutory responsibilities and control of their own funds. After one of these meetings, President Eisenhower said to Gray approximately the following:

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I'm not going to be able to change Allan. I have two alternatives, either to get rid of him and appoint someone who will assert more authority or to keep him with his limitations. I'd rather have Allan as my chief intelligence officer with his limitations than anyone else I know. 48/

With the change of administration on 20 January 1961, the PBCFIA members, as Presidential appointees, resigned. President Kennedy did not at once reconstitute the Board but did appoint a successor by Executive Order 10938, 4 May 1961, to be known as the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB), under the chairmanship of General Maxwell Taylor. J. Patrick Coyne of the NSC staff remained as Executive Secretary. A memorandum from Herman F. Heggen (the Deputy IG) to Kirkpatrick (the IG) dated 5 June 1961 reports a conversation between Cabell and Coyne regarding a meeting which Generals Taylor and Doolittle wished to have on 6 June with either the DCI or the DDCI. "The subject will be the separation of the Director's responsibilities as DCI and and the Chief of CIA." 49/ In a memorandum from Kirkpatrick to Dulles regarding a prospective meeting of Dulles with the PFIAB on 30 June - 2 July 1961, the

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IG noted that the agenda would take up the matter of the separation of the DCI from CIA. 50/ Thus this issue remained alive.

Kirkpatrick's memorandum covering the meeting with the PFIAB on 1 July says that there was further discussion of moving the DCI nearer the White House and away from CIA operations. Dulles was asked what parts of CIA he would feel it would be necessary to take with him. He replied that it would be logical to take all the DDI organization except the Office of Operations (the domestic contact component), but he would want the Foreign Broadcast Information Division which came under that office. He would certainly need to have the Offices of Current Intelligence and National Estimates. "General Taylor said he had talked to all of the members of the USIB except the AEC and FBI and that the majority of them had favored moving the coordinator out of CIA." 51/

By this time, President Kennedy had probably decided to replace Dulles as DCI and probably had his lines out for possible successors. At any event, during the summer the decision was made. After John

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A. McCone became Director, the position was defined in a letter signed by President Kennedy on 16 January 1962, as follows:

In carrying out your newly assigned duties as Director of Central Intelligence it is my wish that you serve as the Government's principal foreign intelligence officer, and as such that you undertake, as an integral part of your responsibility the coordination and effective guidance of the total United States foreign intelligence effort

As directed by the President and the National Security Council, you will establish with the advice and assistance of the United States Intelligence Board the necessary policies and procedures to assure adequate coordination of foreign intelligence activities at all levels

As head of the Central Intelligence Agency, while you will continue to have over-all responsibility for the Agency, I shall expect you to delegate to your principal deputy, as you may deem necessary, so much of the direction of the detailed operation of the Agency as may be required to permit you to carry out your primary task as Director of Central Intelligence 52/

In addition to designating his own deputy as having the major responsibility for running the Agency, McCone appointed Kirkpatrick as Executive Director. Thus one of the recommendations which the PBCFIA had made was consummated, and the DCI was left

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theoretically with more time for his coordinating role.*

From all but Kirkpatrick, there was an affirmative answer to the question: "Can Dulles and the DDCI between them accomplish the necessary internal coordinations and still leave time for the DCI's other responsibilities?"

* General Cabell made the following comments in September 1970:

Several factors should be noted as having a bearing here. The first is that both the management philosophy and the work habits of Dulles and his successor differed. Mr. McCone was accustomed to have some form of managing director conduct the day-to-day affairs of his agency [the AEC]. Secondly, the intelligence backgrounds of the two were vastly different. Dulles was richly experienced in all aspects of intelligence and covert activities and was both able and willing to make unique contributions of substance. His successor was a complete newcomer to both. Thirdly, Dulles's philosophy for effecting coordination of the intelligence activities of government recognized the limits of his power and leaned heavily toward the use of persuasion rather than more authoritarian methods. Lastly, Dulles's methods had done much to develop a functioning Intelligence Community which was ripe for such closer coordination as might be attempted by himself or any other DCI.

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The reason for the affirmative answer lay in Dulles's rich background of experience, his dedication to the Agency, and his devotion of so much of his personal time and attention to it. He did in fact make his own constructive, substantive imprints upon all the important activities and projects of the Agency -- and they were the better for it. This was a most worthy practice for the head of any governmental agency, particularly an unorthodox one in its formative years, providing he could accomplish it -- as Dulles did. However, it was never quite believable to many members of the President's Board, especially when repeatedly needled about it by an insider, that Dulles could perform the feat. They were accustomed to the problems of management of large agencies or operations in which the chief-of-staff system was the accepted solution. They failed to understand that the DCI's problems essentially were not those of "coordination" so much as they were of finding the elusive keys to success in a nonstandard action, whether it be collection or evaluation of intelligence, covert action, or coordination of the intelligence community.

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Dulles's methods were such as to bring out and consider the maximum proportion of important issues bearing upon a problem at hand. Could a chief of staff have done more? One answer to this question lies in General Smith's approach as DCI. Smith had been Chief of Staff for General Eisenhower for the three years of the African, Mediterranean, and European Campaigns of World War II. He thus could be looked upon as an arch-practitioner of the chief-of-staff system. Yet, he apparently saw that in CIA, under the conditions facing him, and given his own predilections, a chief of staff for himself was not desirable.

Dulles did not favor the chief-of-staff system for himself as Director -- nor did the DDCI favor it. The easy and intimate relationship between Dulles and Cabell, and their various "divisions of labor," were important factors. Yet the President's Board, even under several different chairmen, kept returning to the question -- perhaps under prodding -- in efforts to *force* the system upon the DCI. Too

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much of his time was spent in warding off these attempts to make him confirm to someone else's mold, or to create a new office.

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Chapter 5

Outside Supervision of the AgencyDulles's Position

The American attitude towards government does not provide an atmosphere hospitable to a secret intelligence service. It is beyond the scope of this history to speculate on why prejudice against and distrust of government and authority are ingrained in the American public. It is understandable that the framers of the Constitution, fresh from a successful revolution, would seek to protect against the new government's becoming tyrannical. Why the feeling should have persisted so strongly into an era when many citizens look to government to perform many services and provide many benefits is less clear. One explanation is that the federal government has become more honest and more responsive to the general public interest -- as distinguished from special private interests -- as the years have passed.

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It is easy to blame the press and the other public media for the public attitude. It is certainly true that members of this profession take the lead in criticizing the government, and often the motive for their criticism is pique at the withholding of information. When prying into confidential government activities, they mouth pious principles about the right of the public to know, when what they really want is to see their by-line in a prominent place over a particularly juicy story. They would not, however, flourish as journalists, columnists, and commentators unless there was a public avid to read or hear their product. An agency that must operate in secrecy is a special challenge to the media. Self-restraint can be achieved by the press in special circumstances. The existence of the Manhattan Project for the development of atomic weapons during World War II was not revealed, although undoubtedly many reporters knew or could have found out about it, and the media exercised extraordinary self-restraint about the U-2 until the Powers shoot-down occurred. The CIA with its mandate of secrecy, has been, and continues to be, however, a tantalizing source of

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sensational news stories for exploitation by the public media.

It is an article of faith in the United States that governmental probity and responsibility can best be assured by an organizational scheme in which each branch -- the legislative, executive, and judicial -- checks and balances the others. The executive branch acts, but only with funds provided by the legislative and with the knowledge that its actions can be and are investigated by the latter. The legislative can authorize action and provide funds, but the executive need not act or spend and can veto legislation. Over both stands a judiciary which can nullify the acts of either when it finds them repugnant to the constitution or to established law. Yet the judiciary is appointed by the executive, is subject to confirmation by the Senate, and depends on the Congress for funds. Over the whole system broods the press, ever alert to expose and criticize.

Into this established system was inserted an executive agency, the CIA, which, by its very nature, had to maintain secrecy about a large part of its

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activities. This necessarily implied limitations on Congressional oversight, judicial review, and even a limit to the discipline normally imposed within the executive branch by the jealousy with which the various departments and agencies guard their own prerogatives from encroachment. The judiciary was limited in its role in that "executive privilege" covered CIA records and personnel. Although this privilege existed for the whole executive branch, courts were more willing to recognize a claim made by CIA than they were in the case of old-line departments. 53/

This was a situation in which strong tensions were inherent. Every President and every Director recognized this and made efforts and took steps to lessen the tensions. No one was more active in this field than Dulles. Among his other characteristics was a keen sensitivity to the vulnerabilities of a secret organization, a remarkable sense of public relations, and political skill. To these should be added the trait which has been mentioned before -- a desire to avoid enemies and to be liked. This was

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not only personal; it covered also the Agency which meant so much to him, and with which he completely identified himself. Furthermore, he believed in the mission of the Agency and in -- to use a word he would not have used because he would have considered it pompous -- the righteousness of its purpose. 54/

There is little doubt that his efforts and his personality did much to ward off suspicion, if not indeed to gain support for the Agency. He had a vast number of friends and acquaintances; he corresponded with many and made a great many people feel that they were making valuable contributions to the national welfare by passing on their thoughts, observations, or impressions. This was true even when the material in their letters or reports -- and his files contain many of them -- was of a most banal sort. All the people who worked near him felt that he saw too many visitors and made too many speeches. If taxed on this score, his answer invariably was that the public relations of the Agency required it. And there were few who did not recognize his

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expertise and "feel" in this area. It should be noted again that he was a past master in the art of appearing to talk frankly about sensitive information. He would seem to be skating on the thin edge of indiscretion. But when what he had actually said or written was recalled, it was evident that he had cloaked generally known information with an appearance of sensitivity.

His relations with the press were, with a few exceptions, excellent. He had his favorites, but with them he exercised his highly developed ability to give the impression of candor and freedom of information while revealing nothing. It is certain that the generally good press which the Agency had during Dulles's administration, at least up to the Bay of Pigs, was to a large extent the product of his excellent relations with the Washington press corps.

His attention to the Congress, and to individual members, was constant and successful. This was by no means limited to those Congressmen who served on committees which had a direct responsibility for CIA. He continued the practice, initiated by General

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Smith, of inviting Congressmen to visit the Agency and to hear about its work; he often offered to brief Congressmen who were going on foreign travels and asked them to report their observations and impressions when they returned. This obviously made the travelers feel more important; they were touching on the world of intelligence which the fiction writers had made glamorous. His active social life included circles in which he saw and established cordial relations with important members of the Congress, particularly Senators.

No one can demonstrate in any definitive way the impact of Dulles's personality and practices. It is probably true that there was a large element of conscious design in his personal cordiality and his making himself available to important outsiders. Yet the design might well have shown through if it had not coincided with his inner temperament. He was gregarious, liked people, and valued friendly relations. It was also part of his enthusiasm for his "craft" that he believed that there might be an unexpected nugget of information or an unexpected

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opportunity in the most unpromising situation. This added sincerity to his actions. A calculated public relations effort would probably have shown its seams, particularly to politicians used to being wooed by those seeking favors.

He was well aware of the inherent uncertainty of the position of an intelligence agency in the American environment. Older countries, with different cultures, took intelligence operations for granted, whether those operations involved the gathering of information or clandestine activities. It is said that when CIA's financing of American participation in international organizations, such as the US delegations to the World Youth Congress, was exposed as a result of the piece in *Ramparts* magazine and a hue and cry was raised in the American press, the reaction of French opinion was, "what is all the fuss about; every government does that." But there is a belief in the virtues of candor in American thought; Wilson's slogan of "open covenants, openly arrived at" struck a responsive chord in the American public. So Dulles felt, and undoubtedly correctly, that the greatest degree of openness consistent with the requirements

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of security was imperative. When he became Director, a sign on the gate at CIA headquarters read "Government Printing Office" -- a technically correct sign, as the GPO had an operation in the basement of one of the buildings. Yet any taxi driver or sight-seeing bus operator in Washington knew that it was CIA headquarters. One of Dulles's first acts as DCI was to have the sign changed to read "Central Intelligence Agency."

On the more formal side, a variety of steps were taken in the Agency, in the Executive Branch, and in relations with the Congress to guard against any looseness of administration and to offer to knowledgeable people evidence that care was being taken to ensure the propriety and probity of CIA's activities. Internally, an elaborate budgetary and accounting procedure was established. Dulles says in his book *The Craft of Intelligence* that

I had many talks with him [President Eisenhower] about the day-to-day workings of the Agency, particularly concerning the handling of its funds. I recall his instructing me that we should set up procedures in the Agency for the internal accounting of unvouchered funds, i.e. funds appropriated by the Congress

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and expendable on the signature of the Director, which would be even more searching, if that were possible, than those of the General Accounting Office. This was done. 55/

A plan for having the GAO go over the accounts of the vouchered funds of CIA was tried, but it proved unworkable. The attempt to separate expenditures for the Clandestine Services from the rest of the expenditures failed, and the GAO, with the approval of the appropriate Congressional committees, gave up the attempt.* Here it is sufficient to say that elaborate procedures for budget making were in force; the whole was gone over at various ascending levels and finally by the DCI himself. The budget was then reviewed by appropriately cleared representatives of the Bureau of the Budget before it was submitted to the Congress. Fiscal and accounting procedures were rigorous, and Dulles was justified in claiming, as he did, that the finances of the Agency were run as strictly as in any department of the government. This is not to say that all expenditures were productive. Too many projects were "chancy" in their inception, involved turning money

* See DCI-5, *Internal Audit of the Central Intelligence Agency*, 1946-67, 1972.

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over to people who could not be held to strict account, and were less effective than expected, if not absolutely nonproductive. Such were the risks of secret operations, particularly in the covert action field. But it could truthfully be said that the payments had been authorized and cleared by an elaborate mechanism.

Congressional Supervision

Relations with the Congress were quite unlike those of any other part of the government, so far as appropriations were concerned. For reasons of security, CIA's appropriations were always hidden in funds provided ostensibly for other departments and agencies, and no public hearings or debates on CIA appropriations were held.

CIA funds were and are (1973) within the jurisdiction of the armed services subcommittees of the Appropriations Committees, in the early days in the hands of the full subcommittees, later (after about 1955) in the hands of special subcommittees. In all cases, the chairmen of the main committees presided over the subcommittees. In these bodies

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were powerful men who were good friends of Dulles and the Agency. Examples are the men who were alternately chairmen of the House Appropriations Committee, depending on which party controlled the Congress, Clarence Cannon and John Taber. In the Senate, there were Senators Richard Russell, Carl Hayden, Leverett Saltonstall, and Alexander Smith. These men took responsibility for CIA and were in a position to have their way.

The proceedings before these committees were in executive session and any records kept were handled on a TOP SECRET/EYES ONLY basis. In fact, the Agency's budget usually received only a nominal going over by the committees. With an appearance of candor and an intention to tell the committees whatever they wanted to know, Dulles would come before them. Usually he gave a "tour d'horizon" covering developments around the world. Members would ask questions, few of which dealt with internal Agency matters. For years, the subcommittee of the House Appropriations Committee was presided over by Clarence Cannon, the parent committee chairman, who ruled his group with an iron

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hand. It was his invariable habit, when he thought the meeting had gone on long enough, to say, "Mr. Secretary [he often addressed Dulles thus, perhaps in confusion with his brother, John Foster Dulles, or because most of the heads of agencies who appeared were in fact Secretaries], there is one question I want to ask. Do you have enough money to do your business properly?" "I think, Mr. Chairman," Dulles would reply, "I have asked for as much as I can spend wisely. If I get into trouble, I will come back to your committee." "Meeting adjourned." 56/ Reference has been made earlier in this study to the discussion Dulles had with the President's Board on the superficiality of committee consideration of the CIA budget. (The Board told him not to worry if he tried to explain the budget and the committee would not listen.)

There is no intention to imply that Dulles did not disclose to the committee secret sensitive information. He did this, either to the committee during the session or sometimes to the chairman in confidence. One ploy he used to good effect. If he had something

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really sensitive to impart, he would ask the Agency officers who were with him to withdraw, as if to keep the information from them. This was for effect only, since the men who accompanied him, such as Colonel White and DDP Wisner, undoubtedly knew all about the matter Dulles was going to tell the chairman. It impressed the latter, however, with the sensitivity of the information and caressed his ego. 57/

The Senate committees which considered CIA budgetary matters were not run in as peremptory a way, but important members such as Russell, Saltonstall, and Carl Hayden were good friends of Dulles, had confidence in him, and protected him from their colleagues.* There were special cases in which CIA appropriations were handled in the way normal for executive branch matters -- i.e., with open hearings and a public record. The outstanding case was that of funds for the new building at Langley. Except for such rare occasions, hearings were in executive session. At the most, one committee staff member would be present, and

* See *The Office of the Legislative Counsel* to be published in the DCI Historical Series.

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he would be there for the purpose of ensuring that CIA-approved funds were not affected when action was taken on appropriations for the departments used as cover for Agency appropriations. Often there would be no staff members present.

Thus the normal Congressional check on funds was lacking in the case of the Agency. It is doubtful how much the absence of financial control concerned the Congress. The various movements to create a joint Congressional committee to supervise the CIA, analogous to the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy -- notably the proposal of Senator Mansfield in 1954 -- were motivated more by a desire to supervise the substantive activities of CIA directly than a desire to probe more deeply into its budget.

The matter of supervision and review of CIA's activities was approached through finances because that was the normal way in which the Congress, through control of authorizations and appropriations and the operations of the General Accounting Office, kept a check on the executive branch. In the virtual absence of these mechanisms, there have been many attempts in Congress to set up a special Congressional

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committee to supervise the substantive operations of intelligence in general or the CIA specifically.

The Mansfield Resolution

On occasions too frequent to mention, individual Congressmen, political leaders, and public commentators have urged the creation of such a committee, usually making an analogy with the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, which supervises the AEC. No such committee has been set up, although it seemed a near thing in the case of the Mansfield Resolution in 1955-56.

While the Mansfield resolution was pending in the Senate (and a comparable resolution sponsored by Senator Smith of New Jersey was also pending) Dulles sent a memorandum to President Eisenhower stating his personal position. It shows how active Dulles had been behind the scenes.

Mansfield will press his Bill if he can get it out of Committee. I have had many discussions on this subject with both Senator Russell and Senator Saltonstall, chairman and ranking minority member of the Armed Services Committee. Both are opposed to the "watchdog" committee idea in principle and I believe that in the House neither Carl Vinson nor Dewey Short

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[respectively chairman and ranking minority members of the House Armed Services Committee] are favorable to it. It is, therefore questionable whether the Bill will ever reach the Floor, although there is undoubtedly considerable sentiment in Congress for it. [This was a wrong judgment, of course. It did reach the Senate floor.]

After several talks which I have had with Senator Mansfield, the real proponent of the measure, he has modified his original suggestion to a point where it is less objectionable. He now proposes that his Committee be composed of the ranking Senate and House members of the Armed Services Committees, each of which has jurisdiction with respect to CIA in their respective fields.

I have never come out in opposition to the idea of a "watchdog" committee as I felt that tactically it was unwise to do so. In general, however, I would prefer the "status quo" as relations with both the Armed Services Committees have been extremely satisfactory. I see no reason for a change. 58/

Shortly after this time, the matter of the administration's formal position on a watchdog committee was taken up in the NSC. In response to a request from the NSC, Dulles sent in January 1956 a long memorandum analyzing the problems such a committee would raise and in effect recommending against such a committee. 59/ The memorandum did not explicitly oppose the creation of a committee; such a position would

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have been contrary to the public position Dulles had taken that the matter was one for the Congress to decide. It did point out the difficulties which a committee would raise, such as jurisdictional problems with other Congressional committees and duplication of existing arrangements. These difficulties were, of course, more nuisances than substantively harmful.

The principal serious objections were those of security. This was not a question of the security of the members of the committee themselves; over the years many of the most sensitive operations of the Agency were laid before the committees. Dulles wrote, "I do not know of a single case of indiscretion that has resulted from telling these committees the most intimate details of CIA activities, and that includes the secret of the U-2 plane." 60/

One real security problem would lie in the staff which a joint committee would undoubtedly have. As has been said, at most one committee staff member attended CIA budget hearings under the established procedures, and he was kept busy with other duties. If a special joint committee were formed, it would

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have a staff with no duties other than dealing with intelligence and CIA. This would almost certainly mean that the staff members would be looking into details of CIA operations. The AEC's experience with the staff of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy showed this to be true. 61/ Thus a new joint committee staff, assiduously following sensitive CIA operations, would pose security dangers. The committee members themselves would be important, busy men with little inclination or time to pry into details. They would probably leave operational affairs in the hands of Dulles, whom they knew and trusted.

A second security problem would be raised by friendly foreign intelligence agencies. The US Government unfortunately had a general reputation of being unable to keep secrets, a reputation enhanced by the disclosures to be found in the press, particularly such specialized journals as *Aviation Week*. The sharing of intelligence information between CIA and friendly foreign services had always been clouded by fears on the part of the latter that confidential material would be leaked in the United States. Dulles's above-mentioned memorandum to the NSC was forthright,

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but perhaps a little too strong, on this point.

Apart from the increased danger of leaks from more people knowing, creation of the proposed Committee, with staff and other facilities, would in itself tend to create doubt abroad as to the security of United States' handling of material handed over by foreign sources, and would result in the inevitable stoppage of flow of certain sensitive information which by its very nature, is most important to the United States. In this respect, intelligence relationships are more sensitive than any foreign relationship of the Atomic Energy Commission and than almost any foreign relationship of the Department of State.

The distaste of the administration for a joint committee was known by the Congressional leadership. But it was the opposition of important members of Congress that was probably decisive in the defeat of the Mansfield Resolution. Senator Barkley, who had been Vice-President, and Senator Symington, who had been Secretary of the Air Force, both spoke strongly against it, when it was debated on the Senate floor, citing their experience as members of the NSC. Powerful senior Senators -- Russell, Saltonstall, and Hayden -- were opposed. It was the strong opposition of these senior Senators that was the most potent factor. They felt that the proposal implied lack of

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confidence in their performance and invaded their established preserves. At any rate, the Mansfield Resolution which had had some 35 co-sponsors in the Senate was soundly defeated on 11 April 1956, 59 against to 27 in favor, many of the co-sponsors having reversed their positions. 62/

The vote on the Mansfield Resolution was the highwater mark of the watchdog committee effort during Dulles's administration. The subject has, of course, never died down. In 1960 the NSC reviewed its position of opposition to the committee which it had taken in 1956, and decided that no change was called for. Every time the Agency gets into the public press, which is usually in a situation where something has gone wrong, the matter of closer Congressional oversight comes up. In May 1961, after the Bay of Pigs, Senator Eugene McCarthy tried to revive the watchdog committee idea. The *New York Times*, commenting on previous attempts, said, "Presidential opposition [by Eisenhower] and the personal popularity of Mr. Dulles in Congress helped to defeat a Senate resolution in 1956 to set up such a committee." 63/

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~~SECRET~~The Doolittle Committee

The Agency records do not show where or why the impetus for the creation of the Doolittle Committee arose. It is a reasonable assumption, however, that when the Congress revived the Hoover Commission in 1954,* it was known or suspected that one of the Government agencies to be surveyed would be CIA. Since the Hoover Commission would report to the Congress, problems would be presented if it surveyed the Clandestine Services. These problems might be forestalled if an independent discreet survey of the Clandestine Services had been made. Early drafts of the instructions to General Doolittle were prepared in the Agency and at least the drafters of those papers thought it would be set up by Dulles. 64/ The judgment must have been made that an investigation set in motion by Dulles would have less weight than one publicly instigated by the President. So President Eisenhower on 26 July 1954 asked General Doolittle to make a study of the covert activities of CIA. Named as other members

* See p. 117, below.

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of the group were William B. Franke, Morris Hadley, and William Pawley. The President asked that a top secret report be made to him personally and said he would later decide who, if anyone else, should see the report. The President referred to the Clark Task Force of the Hoover Commission and urged that Generals Clark and Doolittle arrange to avoid duplication. This was a clear indication that the President wanted the Doolittle group to preempt the field of investigating the Clandestine Services, and this is what happened, with the exception of the report which Colonel Love, a staff member of the Task Force, made on the DDP area.

Again, the Agency records do not show who picked the members of the group, or why. To the writer's knowledge, General Doolittle was a friend of Frank G. Wisner, the DDP; President Eisenhower knew him; and he was, of course, a most distinguished aviator with a spectacular war record highlighted by his leadership of the flight that bombed Tokyo from a carrier in the early days of the war. Morris Hadley was an able New York lawyer and undoubtedly a friend of Dulles. Franke had been an Assistant Secretary of the Navy and was to become Secretary, and Pawley had been an Ambassador.

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Dulles was in on the planning of the exercise. The files contain copies of his telegrams to the members after their appointments, which referred to previous conversations he had had with them, clearly about the survey. The committee had a minimum staff consisting of an executive director, S. Paul Johnston, a secretary borrowed from CIA, and an "advisor" in the person of the inevitable J. Patrick Coyne of the NSC staff.

The committee moved fast, heard presentations from a wide variety of CIA people, asked what seem to have been quite incisive questions, talked to intelligence officers in the services, and filed its report with the President under the date of 30 September 1954, by which time the Clark Task Force was just getting going. A large number of recommendations were made, most of which related to matters on which CIA was already working. They urged that Dulles cease trying to reach agreement on the "agreed activities" problem and rather take it to the NSC for a definitive ruling.* It recommended that DDP projects be revealed

* Dulles did not do so, but worked it out instead. See Volume II, Chapter 2.

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at an earlier date to the support components so that the latter could perform their functions more efficiently and that the IG's jurisdiction be extended to the Clandestine Services rather than have the DDP/I&R staff do separate inspections. None of the recommendations were drastic and the tone of the report was friendly.

In October a press release was issued by the White House saying that the report had been filed and quoting a statement issued by General Doolittle on behalf of his group. The statement was reassuring, CIA was "doing a creditable job ... is gradually improving its capabilities -- is exercising care to insure the loyalty of its personnel." This last must be related to the fact that Senator Joseph McCarthy was still active in alleging that CIA harbored subversives. McCarthy had indeed told the press, when the Clark Task Force was set up, that he had delivered to General Clark written material incriminating CIA. (General Clark in essence found the material worthless.)

The recommendations of the Doolittle report were dealt out to the appropriate components of the Agency,

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which were to report back the actions which they took. It is characteristic of Dulles that, in the following February, he gave a dinner for the committee members to which he also invited a number of senior DDP officers. They told the committee members what had been done with regard to their recommendations, which obviously pleased them. J. Patrick Coyne was present and made a written report to his bosses, Robert Cutler and James Lay. He waxed lyrical about Dulles, saying

As Mr. Dulles and his assistants briefed us, our views were solicited and were quite freely given.

I was impressed, but not at all surprised, at the very constructive approach which Allen Dulles and all of his assistants have taken to the Doolittle Report. I am convinced that assiduous efforts are being made by the Agency on such of the recommendations contained therein as may be meritorious. The fact that Allen Dulles would take the time to consult members of an extinct committee is as unusual as it is desirable, and it speaks well of Allen Dulles's continuing efforts to improve the performance of the many important national security responsibilities which devolve on CIA.

It is clear that Coyne could not resist the temptation to send a copy of this encomium to Dulles. He found an excuse. He sent a copy of the memorandum,

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saying that he understood that Cutler may have shown the memorandum to the President, and he wanted Dulles to be prepared if the President mentioned it.

The Clark Task Force

The Congress set up a commission in 1954 under Herbert Hoover, Sr., to look into the organization of the Executive Branch and report back to the Congress. This commission was a revival of the group, also under Hoover, which had functioned in 1948. One of the parts of the government which it undertook to investigate was the intelligence community. There was set up a task force under General Mark W. Clark to perform this task. While the general field of inquiry was to be that of organization, it was clear from the work of the previous Hoover Commission that knowledge of the substantive work of a department or agency was a necessary foundation for any recommendations on organization. In the case of the CIA, therefore, this was a mechanism to review the workings of the Agency.

The Task Force initially consisted, aside from General Clark, of Admiral Richard L. Conolly, Donald S. Russell, Captain Edward V. Rickenbacker, and

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E. F. Hollins. Henry Kearns was later appointed a member. (It is said in the records that Kearns was a nominee of Vice President Nixon, who felt that someone from the West should be added as all the original members were from the East.) There was a small staff under the direction of retired General Christianson. Not all the Task Force members or staff concerned themselves with CIA; some dealt with Defense, State, NSA, AEC, etc. General Clark and Admiral Conolly did address themselves to CIA. It was agreed at the outset that the Task Force would not make a thorough investigation of the CIA Clandestine Services in view of the fact that a committee appointed by the President under General Doolittle was making such a survey. The Doolittle Committee was reporting directly to the President and it was obvious that any report on the Clandestine Services would have to be very closely held. The Task Force, on the other hand, was, through the Hoover Commission, reporting to the Congress. When the President appointed Doolittle, he called attention to the Clark Task Force and asked that Generals Clark and Doolittle get together and arrange to avoid duplication. 65/ They

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did, and the Doolittle report, which was dated 30 September 1954, was made available to General Clark.

During the early months of 1955, the Clark Task Force was at work. It heard representatives of many components of the Agency, and members of the Task Force made trips to Europe and the Far East to inspect CIA operations overseas. Dulles met with the Task Force a number of times, as did most of the senior officers of CIA, including representatives of the Clandestine Services. In addition, a staff member, Colonel Herman O. Love, made a separate report to the Task Force on the Clandestine Services as a result of his investigations. The Task Force made a report to the Hoover Commission. 66/ To the Top Secret version of the Task Force report there was attached Colonel Love's report on the Clandestine Services. 67/

The report was a long document, as is hardly surprising, since it went back to Pearl Harbor and OSS to start a description of the development of the concept of centralized intelligence. It covered the whole history. As far as CIA was concerned, it enumerated the organizational components of the overt

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side and what they did. There were a number of recommendations on organizational matters, most of which were relatively unimportant. The Task Force found that there was a serious deficiency in the amount of intelligence obtained on the USSR and implied that if only greater effort were made by clandestine means, this deficiency could be remedied. It blamed the lack of sufficient effort in part on the distractions of what it called "cold-war activities."

It appears that the clandestine collection of raw intelligence from within the USSR has been overshadowed by the concentration by the DCI and others of an inordinate amount of their time and efforts on the performance of the Agency's cold-war functions. The Task Force, therefore, is of the opinion that the present internal organization of the CIA, for the performance of the DDP types of functions, has had a decidedly adverse effect on the accomplishment of the Agency's espionage and counter-espionage functions.

The report gives one the impression, which is supported by the comments of officers who were involved in its proceedings, that it listened to Agency representatives and pretty much accepted what they said. 68/ A majority of the Task Force favored the breaking of the Clandestine Services into two virtually

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autonomous parts, each presided over by a deputy director with the deputy for "cold-war functions" assuming the Agency's representation on the OCB. This is only one example of the cases in which the Task Force dealt with matters which had been discussed over the years and on which opinion had always been divided and which would not lie at rest, no matter how they were decided. Another such problem was whether there should be one support mechanism for the whole Agency or whether the DDP should have a separate support organization.

That the report's discussion of these subjects, and of other controversial matters, seems rather superficial is not surprising. None of the Task Force members, or staff for that matter, had had enough intelligence experience to attain much sophistication in this field. The Task Force and staff members who concerned themselves with CIA were, almost without exception, military men. This is probably what led them to recommend that the DCI have a chief of staff and that the legislation should be changed to permit the employment of many more retired military men (which is what they themselves were). It also probably was the

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reason why the report gave weight to the complaints of the military in the "agreed activities" field.

On the whole, the report was friendly and favorable. It found Dulles "to be industrious, objective, selfless, enthusiastic, and imaginative" although it said that "in his enthusiasm he has taken upon himself too many burdensome duties and responsibilities on the operational side of CIA's activities."

The Task Force recommended, as suggested by the Agency, legislation for improved provisions for overseas employees, including medical care and hospitalization, liberalized retirement, home leave, and help in the education of children. It recommended increased status for the DCI, DDCI, and the various deputy directors, and urged provision of funds for a new building. In connection with the latter, it noted that the Agency was housed in 39 separate dispersed buildings, 29 of which were "temporary, converted type structures." It noted the Agency's computation that the housing of the Agency in a single building would save some \$3 million a year in expenses for guards, shuttles, maintenance, and the like.

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Colonel Love was generally pleased with what he found in the Clandestine Services. He did report that in his opinion the CS office chiefs were too autonomous, access to the DCI was too easy, and too much policy guidance came from low levels in the State Department. He believed more guidance should come from the Secretary of State and the NSC, and he believed there was insufficient effort to obtain clandestine intelligence on the USSR.

The Task Force considered the question of continuing oversight of the Agency and recommended that a mixed permanent body including both members of Congress and distinguished citizens be established to keep a continuing eye on CIA operations. The full Hoover Commission sent a report to the Congress on the intelligence activities of the government, based in part on the report of the Clark Task Force. It did not adopt the Task Force recommendation of a single supervising committee but rather recommended two committees, one of the Congress and the other composed of private citizens. It was this recommendation that was the basis of the resolution introduced in the Senate

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by Senator Smith of New Jersey on 22 July 1955, which has been referred to above.* Senator Smith told Dulles that he was not committed to the proposition, but had introduced the resolution "in keeping with a general practice he had followed for introducing legislation to carry out the various recommendations of the Hoover Commission." 69/ This resolution was referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations. No more was heard of the resolution; the discussion was preempted by the Mansfield resolution, which had been introduced on 14 January 1955.

The President's Board

The Clark and Hoover recommendations and the discussions of the Mansfield resolution were, however, important factors in reviving consideration of some mechanism to meet the concern which had been expressed in government and out over a secret arm of the government operating without continuous oversight. A proposal for a committee of citizens to review CIA operations had been made at least as early as 1954. L. B.

* See p. 106, above.

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Kirkpatrick, in his office diary, records that on
8 June 1954,

the DCI said he had met with the President, General Persons [Eisenhower's military aide], Governor [Sherman] Adams, and Senator Knowland [Republican leader in the Senate]. The President is determined to go ahead immediately with the establishment of a Board of Consultants. Senator Knowland agreed. He plans to have a bi-partisan meeting on Friday of the leaders of both parties at which time Mr. Dulles will make a statement. The chairman of the Government Committee on Operations [sic] will not be present [McCarthy and Hoffman]. 70/

Nothing seemed to have happened as a result of the President's alleged determination.

Almost a year and a half later, while the Mansfield resolution was pending, Dulles wrote to President Eisenhower as follows:

From our earlier conversations I have gathered that you favor the designation of a high-level committee of civilians -- a kind of Board of Visitors -- to meet with the CIA at intervals of their choosing. I would willingly accept such a solution.

It would be helpful if such a committee were appointed before Congress meets next year and hence not follow possible debate on or off the Floor of Congress with respect to the Mansfield proposal. Accordingly I suggest the names of certain persons who might be considered for such a

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committee. I have listed persons who for the most part are thoroughly familiar with our work, who could make a real contribution, and whose security I believe is unquestioned. 71/

The list of people included General James H. Doolittle, Admiral Richard C. Conolly, General Omar Bradley, General John E. Hull, Morris Hadley (a New York lawyer), William B. Franke (Secretary of the Navy and a former member of the Doolittle Committee), Admiral Sidney W. Souers (the first DCI), David K. E. Bruce, Henry H. Wriston (ex-President of Brown University), and Donald S. Russell (a member of the Clark Task Force). The Board was formally set up in January, 1956. The *New York Times* reported that the Senate was "miffed" when the President created the Board, feeling that this action implied a lack of trust in the Congress. 72/ One of the members of the original board was Joseph P. Kennedy, father of the future President. His name was suggested and his candidacy pushed by Dulles, although some of his assistants argued strongly that Kennedy had no sense of security and would talk, certainly to his large and very political family and probably to others. 73/

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In the chapter on OCB, reference has been made to the so-called Jackson Committee of 1953,* which reviewed the propaganda and other activities of the Agency, and also to the Sprague Committee of 1960 which went over much of the same ground. Although neither of these committees was targeted mainly at CIA, they did constitute two more in the series of outside, publicly announced investigations to which the Agency was subjected. In this way they differed from other instances of internal executive branch investigations and reports which were not public, such as the Joint Study Group,** the periodic reports which the Agency made to the NSC, and specific technical studies such as the Baker Report mentioned in the discussion above on ELINT.***

The arguments made for a joint Congressional committee or for such investigations as those of the

* See Volume III, Chapter 2.

** See Volume II, Chapter 1.

*** See Volume II, Chapter 1.

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Clark Task Force and the Doolittle Committee as well as for the President's Boards were twofold. First, it was alleged that they would, by subjecting CIA activities to outside scrutiny, reassure the public and the Congress of the propriety and probity of these activities and would help prevent CIA from going off on tangents inconsistent with US policy. Secondly, it was argued that such watchdog groups would protect the Agency from captious attack, that is, give CIA a friend in court. It is doubtful whether either of these arguments had much validity. There is no evidence that the reports of the Hoover Commission and the Doolittle Committee played any role when the Mansfield Resolution was debated on the Senate floor. When CIA was brought into the public eye after the shootdown of Powers' U-2 and the Bay of Pigs, no voices were raised to point out that the President's Board (PBCFIA) had kept a watchful eye on the Agency. Even Presidential assumption of responsibility, as happened in these cases in 1960 and 1961, was not effective in diverting criticism of CIA. Indeed, the *New York Times*, in urging a Congressional watchdog committee after the

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Bay of Pigs, editorialized, "Above all, CIA must never again be allowed to make policy." 74/

Dulles quotes Congressman Clarence Cannon who, shortly after the loss of the U-2 in 1960, said, "The plane was on an espionage mission authorized and supported by money provided under an appropriation recommended by the House Committee on Appropriations and passed by the Congress." 75/ Cannon was then chairman of the House Committee on Appropriations. As a matter of fact, when Cannon heard the public news about the U-2, he called up Dulles and demanded to know why he had not been previously told about the project. Dulles assured him that he had been told and refreshed Cannon's recollection. At this point, Cannon wrote out the statement quoted above and delivered it on the floor of the House. 76/ Yet this acknowledgment of prior Congressional authorization did nothing to mollify those who criticized what they called the iniquities of CIA.

So long as CIA operates in secrecy in a society which mistrusts secrecy, the Agency will be subject to suspicion, criticism, and ill-informed attack.

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Measures will continue to be introduced into Congress for a "Committee of Oversight." When a proposal covers the whole intelligence community, however, it will almost certainly fail. Such a committee would trespass on the preserves of the various existing committees and subcommittees that are concerned with State, Defense, and other members of the community. Their members would consider the proposal for a general intelligence committee to be a reflection on their discharge of their responsibilities which should be spurned.

A proposal for a committee to supervise CIA alone might avoid this form of opposition, but not wholly. So long as it is CIA's responsibility to coordinate the intelligence community, an active supervision of this function would necessarily get into the operations of the whole community. Thus it could raise the same hackles as a committee covering the whole community. From CIA's point of view, it would be a nuisance, but probably a tolerable one. The proposals to date (1973) have invariably included among the proposed committee members the Congressmen and Senators who feel some responsibility

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for CIA through the Armed Services and Appropriations Committees. They will remain powerful men and prone to protect their ward from harmful prying.

As the years have passed, the need for CIA and its activities has gained greater acceptance if not support. This has been true in the intelligence community, in the Congress, and probably among the public at large. But it would be naive to think that CIA will not remain an attractive target which will swing into view whenever there is a flap or a crisis, or when some member of the press feels the need for publicity.

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Chapter 6

Allen Dulles Steps Down

The change in administration which came with the inauguration of President Kennedy in January 1961 had a major impact on the DCI's relation to the White House.

One of Kennedy's early announcements after his election, however, was that he wanted Dulles and J. Edgar Hoover to stay on in their jobs. 77/ Theodore H. White says that Kennedy did this to establish the point that the heads of the CIA and the FBI were nonpolitical posts. 78/ Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., an intimate of Kennedy's, says that Kennedy reappointed Dulles because he had no alternative. 79/

But the Kennedy style was so different that changes were inevitable. Kennedy was much younger than Dulles and the latter may well have been somewhat ill at ease with a President who went in for seeming youthful. Although there is no evidence that relations between Kennedy and Dulles were not harmonious, a

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pall fell on them in short order with the failure of the attempt to overthrow Castro at the Bay of Pigs in Cuba. Kennedy took public responsibility for that disaster, and indeed was intimately involved in the crucial decisions. In particular, he vetoed the second airstrike, which many felt and still feel precluded any chance of success. The affair occurred only three months after the President took office, and few human beings could have resisted the urge to find a scapegoat, particularly when the coterie of his intimate advisors did their best to make him (and the public) believe that there was nothing to question in his conduct. It is probable that Kennedy felt that a change in the high command of CIA was necessary both to strengthen his own position and to respond to the public outcry. Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., in his *The Thousand Days* writes that Kennedy told him shortly after the Bay of Pigs affair,

I probably made a mistake in keeping Allen Dulles on It's not that Dulles is not a man of great ability. He is. But I have never worked with him and therefore I can't estimate his meaning when he tells me things Dulles is a legendary figure and it's hard to operate with legendary figures [As for CIA] we will have to do something I must have someone there with whom I can be in complete and intimate contact

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-- someone from whom I know I will be getting the exact pitch Bobby [Robert F. Kennedy] should have been in CIA. 80/

There is no objective evidence available as to exactly when Kennedy decided that Dulles should retire, but it was probably not long after the Bay of Pigs, certainly during that summer. It was probably at the same time that Kennedy decided that both General Cabell and Richard M. Bissell, Jr., who as DDP was in charge of the operation for CIA, would also have to be replaced. Bissell told the writer that President Kennedy said to him, "If this were England and I were Prime Minister, I would have to resign. But it isn't England and I can't resign." It has been said that Kennedy said the same to Dulles, adding, "It's you who have to go."

That Dulles knew during the summer that he was to be replaced is borne out by what Livingston T. Merchant told the writer. Merchant was at that time US Ambassador in Ottawa and came to Washington on a visit, during which he saw Dulles. The latter said to him, "Maybe I have done you a bad turn." He went on to say that President Kennedy had asked him to

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suggest three possible candidates for succession to the post of DCI. Dulles told Merchant that he had suggested only one name, viz., Merchant's. No more was heard by Merchant of this suggestion.

General Maxwell Taylor, who was military aide to President Kennedy, was interested in the question of Dulles's successor during the summer. He remarked to Thomas A. Parrott that Dulles undoubtedly wanted to retire. 81/ This was untrue, for Dulles badly wanted to serve as DCI until he reached 70, which would be in April 1963. Rumors were rife around Washington, and one Fowler Hamilton, a New York lawyer who had had several stints of Federal service, was named as a likely candidate.

John S. Earman, who was Dulles's Executive Officer, recalls that one day in August Dulles, who had been at the White House the day before, said to him, "I've been fired." This was perhaps a month before President Kennedy announced on 27 September that John A. McCone would be the new DCI. It is of interest that, according to Parrott, the President's Foreign Intelligence Activities Board was neither consulted nor advised in

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advance. On 28 September, Dulles told the USIB that he would retire. The minutes of that USIB meeting read

Mr. Dulles noted that in a conversation with the President some weeks ago, he alluded to his more than 10 years service with CIA and had expressed his view that a new DCI should be chosen before the end of the year. He indicated that he had lately been consulted on the question of his successor and had expressed to the President his very high regard for the person under consideration. Mr. Dulles advised that Mr. McCone wished a period of indoctrination before assuming full responsibilities as DCI. Accordingly, Mr. Dulles expected to continue in his present position for about two months. 82/

Whether or not the news that he was to be replaced was given to Dulles by the President is not known. Earman thinks it may have been conveyed by Robert F. Kennedy. During those last two months, Dulles went on a trip to Europe with McCone, introducing him to the chiefs of friendly intelligence services and to various CIA stations.*

The formalities attendant on the change of Directors were correct and, at least on the surface,

* McCone's account of his appointment is covered in the history of the McCone administration by Walter Elder, presently in draft (April 1973).

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cordial. General Cabell told the writer that he believed that President Kennedy and his intimates treated Dulles and General Cabell "with kid gloves" in the aftermath of the Bay of Pigs so as not to antagonize them and to keep them from making a public airing of the affair in such a way as might prejudice Kennedy's image. On 17 June, for example, shortly after the Bay of Pigs, Dulles was entertained at dinner at the Robert Kennedy home.

On 28 November 1961 President Kennedy came out to the new CIA headquarters and awarded Dulles the National Security Medal with laudatory remarks. Dulles formally retired the next day, and there is no evidence that he saw President Kennedy again.

In Retrospect

CIA was a very different place when Dulles retired in the fall of 1961 from what it had been in early 1953, both in terms of its position in the Governmental structure and internally. And these changes were more due to Dulles personally than to any other factor. Compared with the situation in 1953, CIA was by 1961 an accepted part of the fabric of the executive branch,

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its functions had expanded greatly, and the interdepartmental jealousies and resentments which had characterized its early days were greatly diminished. Internally, an excellent *esprit de corps* had developed; professionalism, based on competence, experience, and cooperation, was more widespread and was more widely recognized throughout the Government. It is difficult to imagine that any other leader of the Agency could have been so influential in bringing about these changes.

Dulles used to pay great tribute to General William J. Donovan as the father of modern US intelligence. It was Donovan's imagination and drive which created and developed the OSS in World War II, and he was an active and persuasive apostle of the idea of centralized intelligence in the immediate postwar period. But if one were to ask who was generally considered the incarnation of intelligence in the 25 years since 1945, the answer would inevitably be Dulles. Once he had left the practice of law in 1950, US intelligence was the central feature of his life. The success of CIA became his principal interest, and his concern

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extended to all its various facets and to all the people working for it. He concentrated his considerable talents on making the Agency the best intelligence service in the world. To that end he used his unbounded energy and zest, he called upon his ability to charm and to elicit confidence, and he made use of his wide acquaintanceship both in the US and abroad.

No one should underestimate the importance of the accomplishments of General Smith's administration. In addition to firmly establishing the basic organizational framework of the Agency, General Smith subdued, if he did not tame, the forces in the military establishment which resented the invasion of fields of activity which had been traditionally military. But when Dulles became DCI, there was only the beginning of an intelligence community in the sense of a cooperative enterprise. It would be wrong, of course, to attribute the whole growth of the community idea to him. It had been begun by Smith, in particular by the way he treated the IAC members as if they were coordinate and equal members. But there is no doubt that Dulles was personally responsible for the growth of a community spirit.

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Part of this accomplishment resulted from his talent for personal relations. His obvious good will and his deftness in dealing with sticky problems encouraged cooperation. His reluctance to force issues as long as the possibility for accommodation remained inhibited the growth of bitter conflicts. That President Eisenhower and the President's Board were constantly urging him to exert more authority and that he resisted their pressure was undoubtedly known and appreciated by other members of the community, for such things are a staple of governmental gossip.

Dulles also had a personal status which strengthened his position. The fact that his brother was Eisenhower's Secretary of State and admired colleague did him no harm in the bureaucratic jungle, which the Federal Government always is. His reputation as the glamorous Master Spy was reflected onto the Agency. Nor was it any detriment to his position that he had been a partner in one of the most prestigious New York law firms and had an immensely wide acquaintanceship among important people in Washington and abroad. Thus the successful businessmen who formed so much of the

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top echelon of Government officials under Eisenhower knew him as one of their own.

All of these attributes would not have been sufficient had he not had two other characteristics which were invaluable. One was an extraordinary political sense which made him surefooted in his approach to interagency problems, sensing when to press, how best to proceed in a ticklish situation, and when to let the passage of time mellow a relationship. The other trait was his realization that an assertion or assumption of responsibility could be successful only if it was backed up by an ability to perform.

Ability to perform had at least two components -- competent personnel and continuity of experience. In the latter case especially, the Agency was able in many cases to outshine the other members of the community. While both State and the Services had professional officers with long experience, it was also true that many of the people in their intelligence arms were rotated to other work, and away from intelligence and Washington. As officers in other departments came and

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went, and as a generation of officers appeared who had had no experience with intelligence before CIA existed, the value and competence of an experienced centralized professional mechanism for producing positive intelligence was appreciated by more and more people.

A number of instances have been cited earlier in this study in which, in the early days of CIA, the controlling documents -- the NSCID's and the DCID's -- reserved the primary responsibility for producing intelligence to the old-line departments, confining CIA largely to a somewhat nebulous role of "coordination." Such was the case with economic, biographic, and most military intelligence. It has been pointed out how, over the years, more and more of the responsibility for intelligence production was shifted to CIA. Sometimes these shifts were *de jure*, by the amendment of the controlling documents; at times the situation changed *de facto* although the documentation remained the same.

It would be an oversimplification and an incorrect assumption to attribute these developments largely to the negotiating skill and tactful procedures of Dulles. Nevertheless, there can be no doubt that these were

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important factors. When General Truscott guided the revision of the series of NSCID's in 1958, the President's Board complained that in every case provision was made that the DCI, either in acting under these directives, or in issuing subsidiary DCID's, should act "in consultation with the USIB." The Board wanted Dulles to exercise more authority but he resisted.

The intelligence community, Dulles said, was a cooperative group, and actions taken as a result of mutual agreement were more likely to be effective than those ordered. That this desire to achieve agreement might result in inordinate delays was, Dulles felt, a price that had to be paid for concurrence. And the results achieved during the period of Dulles's administration seem to justify his methods of procedure. It was not that he consciously maneuvered to concentrate power in CIA, rather it was that he was imaginative and aware of the benefits to US intelligence of professionalism and objectivity. A separation of the intelligence function from the policymaking function he felt to be of the utmost importance. He stressed this point in the memorandum he submitted when the

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National Security Act was before Congress in 1947. The colloquy with Senator Symington during the "Missile Gap" controversy,* when he believed that it had been alleged that intelligence estimates had been tailored to the budgetary policy of the Administration, is a striking example of his attachment to the principle of objectivity. In that case, Dulles's anger showed plainly and his behavior contrasted sharply with his usual urbanity and respectfulness toward Congressional committees. Those that dealt with him in the drafting of estimates will recall how vehemently he reacted whenever he suspected that a paper had been tempered to take account of US domestic or foreign policy considerations.

During Dulles's administration, the Agency's relations with the Congress were very good -- not that they had been bad during the Smith years. (Smith had been a major figure in World War II, he was forthright and "no nonsense" in his ways, and Congressmen respected him and had confidence in him.) Dulles had friendly personal relations with the members of the appropriate

* Volume V, Chapter 2.

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subcommittees in both Houses. John Taber, the tight-fisted Representative from up-state New York, looked on Dulles as one of his "boys." Clarence Cannon of Missouri, who was Chairman of the House Appropriations Subcommittee for years, appreciated the fact that Dulles smoked the corncob pipes that Cannon gave him. Senators Saltonstall, Russell, Alexander Smith, and Hayden were major powers in the Senate. They dominated the Senate Armed Services and Appropriations Subcommittees which passed on CIA budgets and hence on its activities. They were all personally very friendly to Dulles and translated their responsibility for CIA into a mandate to protect it and the security of its operations from the rest of the Senate.

The Mansfield Resolution for the creation of a watchdog committee to supervise CIA was the highwater mark of the efforts of other members of Congress to establish a more widespread supervision of the Agency. The defeat of that resolution in 1956 was primarily attributable to the senior Senators mentioned above and reflected not only their desire to check any move which might seem to impugn their stewardship of

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CIA's affairs but also their confidence in Dulles.

His good relations with the Congress were not just the result of his attractive personality and his status as a member of the Establishment. They were enhanced by the confidence which he seemed to place in the appropriate Congressmen. He was much more willing to tell them in detail about CIA activities than they were to hear him. It must be repeated that Dulles was a past master at giving the appearance of open candor in describing secret projects, operations, or intelligence while in fact revealing little. Yet he did confide in the Congressional subcommittees many sensitive actions -- for example, the U-2 program -- and it is his testimony and that of his colleagues that such confidences were never betrayed.

CIA was a new type of Government agency, and the secrecy with which it had to operate could easily have made it an attractive target for criticism and investigation by the Congress. The fact that its budget, the number of its personnel, and the nature of its activities were all unknown to the vast majority of the Congressmen who in darkness voted its appropriations would seem to

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have created an almost impossible situation. There is little doubt that the reputation of Dulles as a master intelligence operative, his transparent honesty and the regard in which he was widely held all contributed to allowing the Agency to develop, to make its mistakes and learn from them, with only a minimum of outside interference. It is difficult to think that there was any other man available who could have played the role during the years in which CIA developed into a mature professional intelligence service.

Perhaps less crucial, but yet important, was the world-wide acquaintanceship and reputation which Dulles enjoyed. The Agency developed close and fruitful relations with the intelligence services of many foreign countries. The value of these relationships varied, of course. Some were fairly *pro forma*; in other cases the value of the intelligence received was high and the active cooperation of the foreign intelligence services was of great value to the US. Dulles traveled a good deal, and he always made a point of trying to establish friendship and confidence with the heads of other services. While the day-to-day relations

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in any particular country depended on other factors, such as the local political situation and the personalities involved on both sides, the local relations were against a background of personal contacts between Dulles and other senior intelligence officials. He encouraged visits to the United States by friendly foreign intelligence officials and made a point, whenever appropriate, of seeing and entertaining them. He favored the United States supplying other services with training, advice, and equipment. The CIA in most cases had more money available than other services, and the help that CIA officers were able to offer smoothed the way for close cooperation. [REDACTED]

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As has been pointed out throughout this study, there were many occasions in which Dulles was thrown into close contact with the senior officials of other departments and agencies. Aside from the weekly IAC/USIB meetings, the frequent (usually weekly) NSC sessions, the OCB and the meetings of "designated representatives" under the directives governing covert action, there were many occasions, formal and informal, for meeting with the heads of other Government departments, ambassadors, and even journalists. Dulles particularly enjoyed a comfortable and cordial relationship with the many diplomats in Washington, and he was a frequent guest at formal diplomatic social functions. Thus, within a single month* he attended a formal diplomatic reception at the State Department, a state dinner in the British Embassy in honor of Prime Minister Macmillan, a tulip festival at the Netherlands Embassy, a breakfast meeting and dinner in the evening at the German Embassy in honor of Chancellor Adenauer, a white-tie dinner given by Secretary of State Rusk for Prime Minister Caramanlis of Greece, and a formal dinner for General Gehlen of the West

* April 1961.

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German Intelligence Service at the Alibi Club. The month ended with a meeting with the Arch Duke Otto, the exiled Pretender to the throne of Austria.

Unlike the traditional intelligence officer who by training and instinct avoided the press, Dulles did not hesitate on occasion to meet with well-known journalists like James Reston, David Schoenbrun, Edward R. Murrow, and Walter Lippmann. He also enjoyed making speeches, both inside the intelligence community and before the general public. During the course of a single week in June 1961 he addressed the Naval War College in Newport, R. I., the Army War College at Carlyle Barracks, Pennsylvania, the Harvard School of Business, and Boston College. It was in these contacts that his warm personality, his dedication to avoidance of a policy role, and his quick-witted responsiveness resulted in good personal relations, if not always close friendship.

The influence which Dulles had on the personnel of the Agency would be hard to exaggerate. He was no cold, remote, efficient executive, but rather a personal leader who had the respect and admiration

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-- and in many cases the affection -- of the people who worked for him. And it was part of his genius for personal relations that a great many in the Agency did feel that they were working for him.

When an important Government official leaves office, there are always many letters from friends and colleagues expressing their regret. Dulles had his full quota of these in 1961-62. What is touching and moving, however, is the very large number of letters in his files from people in the Agency of all ranks who had worked with and for him. They all testify to their affection, respect, and admiration for him as a man and as a leader. These are clearly not routine expressions, sent as a matter of manners; they are moving and deeply felt testimonials from his professional colleagues who drew inspiration in their profession from their Chief. The short memorial piece which Sherman Kent, a long-time collaborator, wrote for the *Studies in Intelligence* shortly after Dulles's death in early 1969 speaks with grace and perceptiveness of the devotion and admiration which so many in the Agency felt for him.

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If the inscription under the bas-relief in the lobby of the headquarters building that says "His monument is about you" means the building, it is wrong. His monument is the whole Agency, which would never have become what it is without him.

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